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Surveydata provide a measure of exchange rate expectations
thatissuperior to the commonly-used forward exchange rate in
therespectthatitdoes notincludea risk premium. Weusesur-
'icydataandthe techniqueof bootstrapping totest a number of
propositions of interest. We are able to reject static or "random
walk" expectations for both nominal and realexchange
rates. Expected depreciation ii large in magnitude. There is
even statistically significant unconditional bias: during the 198 1-
85 "strong dollar period't the market persistently overestimated
depreciation of the dollar. Expected depreciation is also
variable1 contrary to some recent claims. The expected future
spot rate can be viewed as inelastic with respect to the contem-
poraneous spot rate, in that it also puts weight on other variables:
the lagged expected spot rate (as in adaptive expectations), the
lagged actual spot rate (distributed lag expectations), or a long-
run equilibrium rate (regressive expectations). In one irnpor-
taut case, the relatively low weight that investors' expectations
put on the contemporaneous spot rate constitutes a statistical
rejection of rational expectations: we find that prediction errors
are correlated with expected depreciation, so that investors would
do better if they always reduced fractionally the magnitude of
expected depreciation. This is the same result found by Bilson,
lana. and many others, exceptthat itcan no longer be attributed
to a risk prerniunt.
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No variable is as ubiquitous in international finance and yet as elusive
empirically as exchange rate expectations. In this paper we adopt a new data
set (two, in fact) to measure expectations: a survey that the Economist has
been conducting six times a year since 1981. and a less frequent one that Amer-
ican Express began conducting in 1976.
1. THE LITERATURE ON EXCHANGE RATE EXPECTATIONS
We begin with brief descriptions of some simple models of exchange rate
expectations that have been prominent in the past theoretical literature, to be
followed by a discussion of how they relate to the standard empirical tests in
the more recent literature on forward market efficiency. Later sections will
present our attempts to apply the survey data to test standard propositions
regarding exchange rate expectations.
We would like to thank Dick Meese and Charles Engel for comments on an earlier draft, John
Calverley, Barbara Bruer, Stephen Marris and Laura Knoy for help in obtaining data, and
the National Science Foundation (under grant no. SES-8218300) and the Institute for Busi-
ness and Economic Research at Ut. Berkeley for research support.-2-
1.1. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF EXPECTATIONS
Lid. Static Expectations (Random Walk)
The simplest hypothesis would be that the expected rate of depreciation is
always zero. Expectations are "static if
EjM÷j = 0 (i)
where E[as÷1] isthe rate of depreciation of the domestic currency that is
expected by investors (not the mathematical expectation). Models of exchange
rate determination often assume static expectations for lack of a better alter-
native. For example, Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977) did so, giving as a
reason that "we have very little empirical evidence on alternative, more compli-
cated expectations formation mechanisms' (p. 308).Theimmortal Mundell-
fleming model of exchange rates under conditions of perfect capital mobility
can be interpreted as having assumed static expectations, so that international
arbitrage equated domestic and foreign interest rates.
More recently, Meese and Rogoff (1983) have found statistically that the
lagged spot exchange rate is a better predictor of the future rate than are
standard monetary models, time series models, or the lagged forward exchange
rate, that is, the exchange rate seems to follow a random walk.1 This finding
suggests that static expectations may be the rational specification, though this
is not the same as saying that it accurately characterizes the expectations that
investors actually hold.
i.i.2. Bandwagon (Extrapolative) and Distributed Lag Expectations
One characterization of expectations formation often claimed by market
participants themselves is that the most recent trend is extrapolated: if the
Other empirical papers exploring the random walk hypothesis include Poole (1967),
Giddy and Dully (1975), Mussa (1979), and Meese and Singleton (1982).-3-
currency has been depreciating, then investors expect that it will continue to
depreciate.2 Such extrapolative or "bandwagon" expectations are represented:
(2)
where Essisthe most recent observed change in the tog of the exchange rate.
and g is hypothesized to be positive. (Static expectations would be the special
case where g =0.)
it has long been a concern of critics of floating exchange rates that
bandwagon expectations would render the system unstable.For example,
Nurkse (1944, p. 116):
[Speculative] anticipations are apt to bring about their own realiza-
tion. Anticipatory purchases of foreign exchange tend to produce or
at any rate to hasten the anticipated fall in the exchange value of the
national currency, and the actual fall may set up or strengthen expec-
tations of a further fall.... Exchange rates under such circumstances
are bound to become highly unstable, and the influence of psychologi-
cal factors may at times be overwhelming.
Nurkse's view was challenged by Friedman (1953), who argued that specu-
lation would be stabilizing. "Speculation" can be defined as buying and selling
of currency in response to expectations of exchange rate changes, as compared
to the counterfactual case of static expectations. This is the definition used,
for example, by Kohlhagen (1979) to evaluate whether or not speculation is des-
tabilizing. A property of bandwagon or extrapolative expectations is that the
expected future spot rate as a function of the observed current spot rate has
an elasticity that exceeds unity, as contrasted to static expectations, which has
an elasticity equal to unity. It follows that speculation based on bandwagon
expectations is destabilizing because speculators sell currencies that are
appreciating.
ZSee,for example, the discussion in Dooley and Shafer (1q83, pp. 47-8).-4-
Thenext several models to be discussedgo the opposite direction. They
can all be subsumed under the label Ine1astitZxpectatJo-a change in the
current spot rate induces a revision in the expected futurelevel of the spot
rate that, though it may be positive, is less thanproportionate.An observed
appreciation of the currency generates an anticipation of a futuredepreciation
of the currency back, at least partway, toward itspreviously expected level. It
then follows that speculation is stabilizing, becausespeculators sell currencies
that are appreciating. Argy and Forter (1972), Niehans(1975) and Dornbusch
(1976a) pointed out the impltcations of inelasticexpectations for stability in
macroeconomic models of the Mundell-Flem.ing type. Under staticexpectations,
perfect capital mobility would tie the domestic interest rateimmovably to the
world interest rate. As a consequence amonetary expansion, for example,
would have to induce a very large depreciation of thecurrency, large enough so
that the excess supply of money could be absorbed withouta decline in the
domestic interest rate. (The depreciation wouldnormally work to increase the
demand for money by stimulating output.) Under inelasticexpectations1 on the
other hand, a depreciation would generateexpectations of future appreciation;
as a consequence, would be willing to hold domestic bonds when the
domestic interest rate fails short of the world interest rate,so that the depreci-
ation of the currency need not be large enough toaccomplish in itself the
entire equilibration of the domesticmoney market. In other words, the
exchange rate need not be as variable under inelastic expectations as it would
be under static expectations (let alone under bandwagonexpectations).
One case of inelastic expectations is equation (2) withg less than zero. An
equivalent representation would be
ECs ÷3 = (1+g)s — (2')
whereis the logarithm of the current spot rate andg is hypothesized to be-5-
negative. The hypothesis is a simple form of Distributed Lag Expectations.
(Obviously we could have longer lags.)However there are several other
examples of inelastic expectations that are more prominent in exchange rate
theory.
1.1.3. Adaptive Expectations
The form specified by Argy and Porter (1972) and Dornbusch (1975a) was
an old standby in the economist's traditional arsenal of expectations models:
the expected future spot rate is formed adaptively, as a weighted average of the
current observed spot rate and the lagged expected rate:
=(1y)s+ (3)
whereis hypothesized between 0 and 1 for expectations to be inelastic.
Adaptive expectations have also been considered by Kouri (1976). as a third
alternative after static and rational expectations, as well as by many other
authors.3
1.1.4. Regressive Expectations
Dornbusch (1976b) followed with a more elegant specification, consistent
with dynamic models in which variables such as goods prices converge toward
their long-run equilibrium values over time in accordance with differential
equations (or in discrete time, in accordance with difference equations):
E[s÷1](1—i); + . (4)
Hereis the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, and i5 (a number between 0
and 1 in this discrete-time version) is the speed at which s is expected to
regress towardas can perhaps be seen more clearly in the equivalent
See Kohihagen (1978, pp. 9-17) ror a survey of adaptive and other models of expecta-




The long-run equilibrium, s, can itself change. It is normally assumed to obey
Purchasing Power Parity, increasing proportionately in response to a change in
the domestic money supply and price level.
1.1.5. PPP Expectations
The hypothesis of ex ante Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) suggests an alter-




where R[ rr1 — isdefined as expected inflation at home minus abroad.
One can think of this equation as having been derived by taking first differences
on PPP in its level form. If PPP actually held in level form, it would simply be
the special case of regressive expectations, which we just considered, where ,
thespeed of adjustment to PPP, is equal to 1. But deviations from absolute FPP
are observed to have been extremely large. Indeed it is often impossible to
reject statistically the hypothesis that the speed of adjustment to PPP is zero.
Such empirical findings have led some economists to swing from the one
extreme, the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is constant, to the oppo-
site extreme, that the real exchange rate follows a random walk, in other words
that PPP holds jj1inexpected rate of change form. This alternative way of
deriving equation (5) is said to have a basis in efficient markets theory, as an
arbitrage condition so that agents considering buying goods in one country and
shipping them to another cannot expect to make excess profits. (See Roll
(1979).) This argument seems to ignore that, to the extent that international
goods arbitrage is possible in rate-of-change form, it should in theory be even
U-7-
more powerful in level form. When one country's goods have become more
expensive relative to other countries, as in the recent very large real apprecia-
tion of the dollar, goods arbitragers should buy goods in the country where
they expect prices to be the lowest, not in the country where they expect the
lowest inflation rate. Thus arbitrage should work to push the real exchange
rate back toward the equilibrium level, not to enforce a zero expectation of
future changes in the real exchange rate. Nevertheless PPP in expected rate-
of-change form warrants testing. Theoretical arguments aside, there are
enough empirical studies supporting the random walk hypothesis for the actual
real exchange rate process to make it a serious hypothesis for describing the
expected process. In any case, it is certainly true that those countries that
experience chronically high inflation rates, for example Italy, have currencies
that tend to depreciate against those of countries with low inflation rates, for
example Switzerland, and investors can be expected to incorporate this ten-
dency.4
1.1.6. Inflation-Adjusted Regressive Expectations
Our last form of expectations combines the tendency for the exchange rate
to regress toward an equilibrium value, represented by equation (4), with the
tendency for the equilibrium value itself to change over time with secular
inflation, represented by equation (5).
E[&÷1]=t(a —se)+ E[ir+1 —7r1] (6)
Theaugmentation of regressive expectations with the secular term is necessary
in models 'with steady state rates of money growth. These are useful for study-
4WhileICrugman (1978) and many others documented the slow tendencyto adjustto-
wardPPP, Frenkel (1981) was clearly the most influential in eradicating support for it as a
literal statement about the levels of exchange rates and prices in the short run. Roll (1979)
makes the "market efficiency' argument for PPP in rate-of-change form. Roll (1979) and
Darby (1981) offer enipirical support for the hypothesis.-8-
ing. for example, the overshooting resulting from recent disinflations in the
United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries.5
In equation (6) we test iS =0to test the null hypothesis of equation (5) --
exante FFP expectations in the Roll (1979) sense that the real exchange rate
follows a random walk --againstthe meaningful alternative that the exchange
rate is expected to regress toward its historic PPF level. As in the case of sim-
ple regressive expectations, the closer 15 is to unity, the more rapidly is the
exchange rate expected to adjust to PPP.
So far we have not paid much attention to the idea of Rational Expecta-
tions,or its analog in deterministic models, perfect foresight. Making the
assumption of rational expectations is the sinequa nonof modern
macroeconomic model-building; but what it actually entails is entirely depen-
dent on the rest of the model. For example, regressive expectations are
rational within the context of the Dornbusch model (with a particular value
imposed on the parameter 15, closely related to the speed of adjustment in
goods markets). Similarly, static expectations are rational if the true spot
exchange rate process is a random walk. Adaptive expectations can be rational
in other models (as Mussa (1976) has shown in the context of expected money
growth rates). Even the sort of exchange rate instability associated with
bandwagon expectations is consistent with rational expectations in models of
speculative bubbles.6 Thus rational expectations cannot be listed as a well-
defined alternative specification of expectations formation on a par with the six
Frankel (1979), Buiter and Miller (1982), and others have proposed equations like (8) in
order to introduce secular expected inflation into the Dornbusch overshooting model. In
theory, the secular term can be defined variously as the expected money growth
difterential, the expected short-term rate of change of relative price levels, or the rate of
change of a longer-term equilibrium target S. But, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1964) have
shown, the various alternatives are equivalent in the type of models generally used; all that
changes is the precise nature of the dependence of the rational value of 15 on the other
parameters in the system..
Papers exploring models of stochastic bubbles include Blenchard (1979), Dornbusch
(1982), and Meese (1955).
L,.-9-
enumerated above. But the rational expectations hypothesis isintegral to the
largest existing empirical body of literature relevant to the subject ofexchange
rate expectations, tests of efficiency in the forward exchange market, towhich
we now turn.
1.2. FORWARD MARKET EFFICIENCYTESTh
Mostempirical work on exchange rate expectations uses the forward rate
as the measure of investors' expectations. If one were interested only in choos-
ing the most realistic specification for the formation of expectations, one might
simply regress the measure of expectations directly against some of the vari-
ables that appear in the foregoing equations: the current and laggedspot rate,
lagged expectations, and so forth. Such "direct" regressions are tried out
below. But a major drawback with this approach, which applies here and in
much of macro-econometrics, is that there is no good reason to think that the
error terni in such a regression would be independent of the righthand-side
variables. This may explain why there have not been many direct regressions of
the forward rate.
Instead, most empirical work features the forward rate prediction error,
that is, the ex post realized future spot rate less the current forward rate, as
the dependent variable. Under the assumption that the forward rate indeed
accurately reflects investors' expectations, a regression against any vatiables
available to investors at the time that expectations are formed is a test of
rational expectations. Under the null hypothesis, the error term should be
uncorrelated with the righthand-side variab'es and serially uncorrelated, and
all coefficient estimates should be zero. Most tests of rational expectations do
not consider what the alternative hypothesis is. But we shall see that in some of
the tests, the alternative hypothesis does have a natural interpretation in- 10-
termsof the models discussed above.
The majority of existing rational expectations tests fall into two categories.
In the first, the prediction error is regressed against its own lagged values; in
the second, the righthand-side variable is the forward discount.
1.2.1. Tests of Serial Correlation
A simple univariate test of seriaL correlation in the prediction errors made
by the forward rate, or by any other measure of the expected future spot rate
.E[as÷1],7 isthe following regression:
—4÷1=7(E_1[S]—S) ÷ (7)
where 'isthe autocorrelation coefficient. In the early years after exchange
rates began to float in 1973, it was possible to use univariate tests to nd sta-
tistically significant serial correlation.8 A more sophisticated test is to regress
the prediction error in a given country's exchange rate against the previous
prediction errors in other exchange rates. In later years it may have become
more difficult to reject the null hypothesis without the more sophisticated tech-
niques.9
-
Thenull hypothesis, rational expectations, is zero coefficients on all lagged
prediction errors. What is the alternative hypothesis? It is that investors'
expectations are insufficiently, or overly, adaptive. Assume that the true best
predictor of the future spot rate is a weighted average of the current spot rate
and the lagged expectation:
ft= (172)t+ 2.t + (8)
Then investors' expectations would be rational if and only iffrom equation
When speaking of the forward rate as an accurate measure of expectations, we are im-
plicitly assuming that there is no risk prerrilurn.
See for example, Dooley and Shafer (1976, 1983). Cornell (1977) and Frankel (1980).
See Hansen and Hodricl< (1980), Curnhy and Obstfeld (1981), and Frankel (1985),
Cd.- 11-
(3) wereequal to 72fromequation (8). If we take the difference of equations (3)
and (8),
E[ s+1] — St÷1 = f(1—y)
—
(1—72)]s÷ (71—y2)E_1[s 3 + ()
we get an equation precisely equivalent to (7), with 7 = — Thuswe see
that a positive autocorrelation coefficient 7 means that expectations are
insufficiently adaptive, and a negative autocorrelation coefficient means that
they are overly adaptive.
1.22. Tests of'ExcessiveSpeculation'
A large number of studies of forward market efficiency feature as the right-
hand side variable the expected rate of depreciation rather than the lagged
prediction error or other variables:
E[s1] =a4-dE[As1+1}+ (10)
Ifinvestors' expectations are measured by the forward rate, then £[ 21]s
the forward discount.The null hypothesis is that the prediction errors are
random a =ci=0.A more common representation of the equation can be
derived in terms of changes, by noting that the lefthand expression is equal to
E[ &÷J —As÷1.The equivalent test is to regress the ex post realized rate of
depreciation against the forward discount, with a hypothesized coefficient of 1:
=—a+(1—d)E{As1] — (10')
Regression equations like (10') evolved from earlier regressions of the sim-
ple level of ;41againstthe level of the current forward rate (by Frenkel (1976)
and others), after it was realized that the levels were likely to be nonstationary.
Tests in either the form of (10) or (10') have been performed by, among many
others, Tryon (1979), Levich (1980). Bilson (1981a), Longworth (1961), Fama
(1964) and Huang (1984). If the rational expectations null hypothesis is=0,- 12-
what interpretation can we give the alternative hypothesis? Bilson (1981b)pro-
posed that the alternative of dgreaterthan 0 be termed "excessive specula-
tion", because it would imply that investors could do better if they were always
to reduce fractionally the magnitude of their forecasts of exchange rate
changes, and that the alternative of ci less than 0 be termed "insufficient
speculation", because it would imply that investors could do better if they were
always to raise multiplicatively the magnitude of their forecasts of exchange
rate changes ,Theusual finding has been the former: a coefficient (i-ci) in
equation (io') significantly less than 1, i.e. a positive value of ci. Indeed, the
coefficient (i-ci) has often appeared much closer to 0, which is the random walk
hypothesis, than to 1:the current spot rate is a better predictor of the
future spot rate than is the current forward rate.10 Occasionally (i-d) has even
appeared to be significantly less than 0, suggesting that the exchange rate
tends to move in the opposite direction from that expected by investors! More
often, the optimal predictor has appeared to be a convex combination of the
spot and forward rates.
1.2.3. Systematic Expectational Errors or Risk Premium?
The most popular alternative hypothesis in regressions of equations like
(10) is that domestic and foreign securities are imperfect substitutes because
of risk. The forward rate does not accurately reflect investors' expectations in
the first pLace; the two differ by a risk premium, defined as follows:
"re f —E2[s÷1] (ii)
whereis the log of the forward exchange rate used in the regressions
described above. Equivalently, the risk premium can be defined in terms of
rates of change:
10Thisfinding appears in Frankel (1980), Bilson (198!a, 1985), Meese and Rogoff (1983),
and Huang (1984), among others.- 13-
=fd1—E[As1+1]. (11')
where fd is the forward discount, defined as f —s.11
Thecrucial impediment, when systematic prediction errors (separating the
forward rate from the optimal predictor) are detected empirically, lies in distin-
guishing whether they are due to a failure of rational expectations (separating
investors' expectations from the optimal predictor), or to the existence of a
riskpremium(separatingtheforwardratefrominvestors'
expectations).Most of the literature arbitrarily assumes away one of the
two, in order to concentrate on the other. For example, in interpreting their
tests of equations (to)and(10'), Fama (1984), Hodrick and Srivastava (1955)
and Bilson (1985) explicitly assume that expectations are rational, in order to
learn about the behavior of the risk premium. Bilson (1981a. 1981b), Longworth
(1961) and others, on the other hand, explicitly assume away the risk premium.
in order to learn about expectations.
In his provocative paper, Fama proposes a decomposition of the forward
discount into the risk premium and the expected rate of depreciation, as in
equation (11') above:
fd+[M÷1]. (11")
His finding is that tbe variance of the risk premium is larger than the variance
of expected depreciation, though it is not entirely meaningful to speak of how
much of the variance of the forward discount is attributable to the variance of
the risk premium and how much to the variance of expected depreciation
(because of a large negative covariance). Hodrick and Srivastava (i985) report
the same finding (p. 18). Bilson (1985 p. 63) speaks of a new 'empirica para-
digm that most of the variation in the [forward] premium reflects variation in
Sonic of the tests described above use the domestic-foreign interest differential in
place of the forward discount; the two are normally equal, by covered interest parity.- 14-
therisk premium rather than variation in the expected rate of appreciation."
He takes the argument a step further, and suggests that possibly none of the
forward discount is attributable to expected depreciation on the part of the
market: "It is consequently not possible to reject the view that the forward
premium, and hence international differences in short-term interest rates, are
unrelated to either actual or market forecasts of exchange rates.In other
words, flilson (1955) concludes, from estimates close to d = 1 in equations like
(10)and(10'), that the random walk holds not only as a description of the
actual spot rate process but also as a description of expectations formation)2
2. THE SURVEY DATA
Without a measure of exchange rate expectations that is more direct than
the forward rate, any conclusions regarding the nature of either the risk prem-
ium or expectations formation can be no more than assertions.
This paper uses survey data of exchange rate expectations compiled from
two separate sources. The Amex Bank Review (AMEX) publishes surveys taken
once or twice annually from early 1976 to the present.13 For each survey, 250-
300 central and private bankers, corporate treasurers and finance directors
and economists were asked to record their expectations of the level of five
major currencies against the dollar, six months into the future. The second
survey was conducted by the the Economist Financial Report (ECON). Begin-
fling in June 1981, the Economist polled a sample of 13 leading international
banks six times annually, asking for their expectations at three and six month
12Earlierpapers ñnding that the rational expectation is closer to zero depreciation than
to the forward discount, such as Bilson (1981a), Meese and Rooff (1983) and Huang (1984),
did not explicitly conclude that the sante is necessarily true of investors' expectations;
these authors supported the random walk model of the spot rate! but were relatively agnos-
tic on investors' expectations.
Artier Bank approximate survey dates were January 78, July 76, January 77, June 77,
November 77, June 78. November 78, June 81, June 82, June 83, and June 84.- 15-
horizons.Both surveys record expectations of the same five major currencies
against the dollar: the pound, French franc, mark, Swiss franc, and yen.
Economists generally distrust survey data. It is a cornerstone of positive
economics" that we learn more by observing what people do (in the market-
place) than what they say. Nevertheless, alternative measures of expectations
all have their own drawbacks. For this reason, closed-economy macro and
finance economists have found survey data useful, in studies of expected
inflation (where the Livingston survey has been the most popular), expected
announcements of the money stock and other macroeconomic variables (where
Money Market Services, Inc. is the source), and even expectations of interest
rates.To our knowledge, there have been no studies of exchange rate expec-
tations using survey data. This might be considered surprising in light of the
great interest in the subject evident in the large literature on the forward
market discussed in the preceding section. One could even argue that the case
for using survey data on exchange rate expectations is on firmer ground than
the case for using survey data on inflation expectations: the respondents to
the AMEX and Economist surveys are probably more direct participants in the
spot and forward; exchange markets than the respondents to the Livingston
survey are in the various financial and goods markets of interest. In any case,
the exchange rate survey data surely contain at least some useful information
that warrants study. It seems likely that the failure of economists in the past
to use the data is attributable only to lack of awareness of its existence.
One serious limitation to the AMEX and Economist data should be
registered from the start, the very small number of observations that are avail-
able as of 1985:only 11 dates for the AMEX data and 24 for the Economist
data.14 We alleviate this problem by pooling the cross-section of five currencies.
14Thelargest sample of non-overlapping observations for the Economist data is only
14.Ifoverlapping observations are used, e.g. 6-month forward expectations observed- 16-
andwe use Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to correct for the obvi-
ous existence of contemporaneous correlation of error terms across curren-
cies. Furthermore, because it has been claimed that exchange ratesmay have
non-normal distributions1 which would render regular test statistics particu-
larly unreliable in small samples, we adopt the technique of bootstrapping to
get better estimates of the standard errors.
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Before we set out to test the hypotheses of interest, some descriptive
statistics and preliminary tests are in order.
3.1. EXPECTED DEPRECIATION VERSUS TilE RISK PREMIUM
First and perhaps foremost, by using survey data some light can be shed
on questions concerning the relative size and volatility of exchange rate expec-
tations. As we have already noted, recent papers by Farna (1984), Hodrick and
Srivastava (1985), and Bilson (1985) argue that their apparent rejections of
simple forward market efficiency can be viewed as evidence of a risk premium
that is more variable than expectations. To see this argument, note that the
slope coefficient (1—d) in equation (10') can be rewritten as,
cov[t.sst÷1,fd] cav[b4[ As÷1], fd} 1—d = — =
(12) var [fd] var[E [÷1J]+var [rp ].i-2cov [E [41]1I
+cov[L[as+1],7p]
var[E[ As÷1]] + var[rp] + 2ccv[E[ As1]. rm]
where the second equality follows from assuming rational expectations. Tf
every 3 months, the prediction errors are serially correlated even under the null hypothesis
of rational expectations. See for example Hansen and Hodrick (1980) or Frankel (1980,ap-
pendix).
See for example, Westerfield (1977)
C- 17-
d >it follows that var(rpg) > var(F[ £s+1]). We have already mentioned
that since the exchange rate is approximately a random walk, rationally
expected depreciation would be small in magnitude. Equation (12) and the
empirical finding that 1—ti is relatively close to zero seem to confirm that
investor-expected depreciation is relatively static as well.
Both our sets of survey data, however, indicate that expected depreciation
does exhibit considerable variation, often more in fact than does the implied
risk premium. Table 1 shows the variance of expected changes in the spot rate
and of risk prernia for each data set, individually and averaged across curren-
cies.18 Note to begin with that the magnitude of the ex post exchange rate
changes (first column) dwarfs the forward discount (second column), an empiri-
cal regularity noted by Mussa (1979) and many others. For example. a variance
of .04 is a standard deviation of .20 and implies that roughly 95 percent of quar-
terly exchange rate changes lie in a band of plus or minus 40 percent on an
annualized basis (or 10 percent in a quarter).
Of greater interest, the variance of expected depreciation is comparable in
size to (or slightly larger than) the variance of the risk premium, and is also
several times larger than the variance of the forward discount. The relative
stability of the forward discount masks considerable variation in its com-
ponents, corroborating Famas (1964) finding that the risk premium is nega-
tively correlated with the change in the spot rate.
To give an idea of the relative importance of expected spot rate changes
and the risk premium as components of the forward discount, mean squared
values (MSV) are compared in Table la. An implication of static expectations is
that the MSV should be zero. The table shows this is clearly not the case. Not
16Averagingthe variance across cunencies is equivalent to computing the variance of
the entire sample when allowing countries to have difierent means.
U /- 16-
only is the MSV of expectations greater than that of the risk premium, but it is
surprisingly large in comparison with the MSV of the forward discount.
These measures of variability suggest that survey expectations do not
merely mimic the forward discount. The same conclusion follows from the first
moments.17 Table 2 shows the averages of alternative measures of expected
depreciation. The most striking fact is that the survey numbers show consid-
erably greater expected depreciation of the dollar against other currencies
than do the forward market numbers. For purposes of comparison,the nominal
interest differential on Eurocurrency deposits is also shown. The interest
differential is much closer to the forward discount, confirming past evidence
that covered interest parity holds, and foreign exchange markets today can be
treated as essentially frictionless.
3.2. UNCONDITIONAL BIAS
The simplest possible test of market efficiency is to see if expectations are
unconditionally biased, if inve stors systematically overpre dict or underpredict
the future spot rate. Tests performed in the 1970s clearly failed to find any
unconditional bias.36 But in the iPSOs the dollar has consistently sold at a
discount in the forward exchange market against most other major currencies,
as is shown in Table 2, and yet the great long-anticipated dollar depreciation
has failed to materialize. Could there be unconditional bias in the more recent
data?
Table 3 reports formal tests of unconditional bias. In the case of each of
the five currencies, the 3 and 6 month forward discounts have indeed systemat-
ically underpredicted the value of the dollar (overpredicted its depreciation)
17TheAmsz Bank Survey of &pectations; Summary of ResuLts 1976-1978 also reports
finding considerable diflerences between survey data and the forward discount.
18SeeCornell (1977), Stockman (1978) and Frankel (1980).
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during the period June 1981 to March 1955. The bias is highly significant sta-
tistically.
There are four possible explanations for this finding. The first is a risk
premium separating the observed forward discount from investors' true expec-
tations. But hi Table 3 we also use our Economist survey data for the period
Lune 1961 to March 1985, and we find unconditional bias even larger in magni-
tude and in level of statistical significance (as one would expect from observing
in Table 2 that the survey data shows an even greater rate of expected dollar
depreciation in the 1960s than the forward discount). If the survey numbers
are to be believed at all, the unconditional bias is present in actual investor
expectations, and cannot be attributed to a risk premium.
The second possible explanation is a convexity or Jensen's inequality term
that enters into the mathematical expectation of the log of an uncertain
exchange rate even when risk-aversion is not a concern. However, the convex-
ity term is bounded above by the conditional variance of the exchange rate;
with an unconditional variance of depreciation on the order of 0.0428 (3 month
annualized annualized rates) and conditional variances on the order of 0.0424
or 0.0370 (conditional on the forward discount and survey numbers, respec-
tively), the convexity term is necessarily too small to explain the bias that
shows up in Table 319
Thethird explanation is that there is indeed a gross failure of rational
expectations, unattractive as such a conclusion would be on theoretical
grounds. The fourth, which is the one to which we tentatively incline, is that
the rational expectation for the value of the dollar in recent years has been the
weighted average of a small probability of a large decline coupled with a large
In Frankel (3985), footnote13,the upper bound for the convexity term under risk
neutrality is shown to be the conditional variance of the spot rate.More generally.
McCulloch (1975) disáuss the convexity term and its small size given actual variances- 20-
probability of continued strength. This could be the case if the 1980-85 appre-
ciation of the dollar were due either to a speculative bubble as mentioned above
(in which case the small-probability event would be the bursting of the bubble)
or to fundamentals (in which case the small-probability event would be a large
change in fundamentals such as the monetary/fiscal policy mix). Either way.
the distribution of the exchange rate would be non-normal and the reported
test statistics would be untrustworthy.2°
It requires emphasis that this new finding of unconditional bias is an
artifact of the strong-dollar period, and not of our survey data. The Economist
survey data is not available before 1981. but the AMEX data is, and it shows no
statistically significant unconditional bias when the pre-1980 years are
included, even though --likethe Economist data --itshows a statistically
significant tendency to overpredict the value of foreign currencies against the
dollar during the post-1980 period. The unconditional bias is uniquely a
phenomenon of the "overvalued dollar" period.
Whichever of the explanations for the unconditional bias during the 1980s
is the correct one, we think it desirable to separate it out from conditional
biasedness and other hypotheses to be tested. We would like to know if predic-
tion errors in one period are associated with prediction errors in the following
period even taking the unconditional bias as given. So that the unconditional
bias would not dominate the results, in most of the test results reported in the
following section we included constant terms for each currency and a dummy
variable for the 1981-1984 period.
20 This econometric difficulty is often known as the "peso problem;" Krasker (i980) off en
a technique for dealing with it,
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4.TESTS WHETHER EXPECTATIONS PUT TIlE CORRECT 'WEIGHT ON TILE CONTEM-
PORANEOUS SPOT RATE AS OPPOSED 10 SEVERAL OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE IN-
FORMATION SET
In this section we investigate alternative specifications of expectations
mentioned above and test whether the results are consistent with rational
expectations.A general framework for expressing equations (1) through
(to') would be to write the expected future spot rate as a weighted average of
the current spot rate with weight 1—fl1,andsome other element,;, with weight
E[M÷1J=
a1÷ fl1(;— s)+ (13)
A regression of equation (13) is the direct test of whether the other element
is important in the formation of expectations. A finding that ; is not impor-
tant1 or that fl1= 0.would be interesting in itself since it would be consistent
with the ease of static expectations.
Then, once we have a sense of the weight placed on z in equation (13), it
would be helpful to know if the spot rate follows a process which gives compar-
able weight to
=a2+ft2(z—)+s2141 (14)
Thehypothesis that expectations are rational is simply that a1 =a2and=fl2.
This hypothesis can be tested formally by subtracting equation (14) from equa-
tion (13),
.E[ &÷]
— = a+fl(z—.s) + (15)
andtestingaO.fl=0,whereaa1—a2andfl=fl1—fl2. We referto this as
an indirect test of expectations formation. A reason for preferring an indirect
test of expectations, equation (15), is that it is hard to think of stories for- 22-
equations(13) and (14) in which the error term is uncorrelated with the
righthand-side variables. But under the null hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions the error term in (15) does satisfy the Gauss-Markov assumptions,21By
testing = 0 it is possible to determine if expectations put too much or too lit-
tle weight on the contemporaneous spot rate as opposed tox, relative to what
is rationaL In addition, by examining j3 andin the direct equations (13) and
(14) separately, we can determine whetheris in fact a meaningful input into
the formation of expectations and whether it describes the actual spot rate
process. If not, then a test of fi=0 in the indirect equation (15) is not a power-
ful test of rational expectations: a finding that investors put the correctweight
onis a less interesting finding if that weight is zero. Finally, by running each
of these regressions once using the survey data once using the forward
discount, we can highlight the extent to which a risk premium in the forward
discount makes fdanunreliable proxy for expected depreciation.
In light of the relatively small number of data points, for each regression
we conserve degrees of freedom by constraining slope parameters to be equal
across currencies. The coefficients can then estimated using OLS. A problem
with such aggregation is that the nominal degrees of freedom are overstated
due to highly significant contemporaneous correlation across currencies. This
difficulty is to be expected since all cross rates are expressed in terms of the
dollar (and also since the EMS restricts the relative variability of the DM the
French Franc, and to a limited extent the Pound). To exploit the correlation we
use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions on the largest data set, the Economist
survey 3 month data.22
21Throughoutthe paper we assume conditional homoscedasticity.
22Frankel(1980), Bilson (1981a) and Fama (1954)areforward market studies which dis-
cuss the useofthe StiR technique.
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Although SUR offers some improvement in efficiency, it comes at a high
cost in- small samples. The estimates become nonlinear functions of the residu-
als so that, even under normality, it is necessary to appeal to asymptotic distri-
bution theory for standard errors. With only 12 or 13 data points per currency
such practice warrants more than the usual healthy skepticism of reported
confidence regions. In support of the asymptotic standard errors, bootstrap
regressions are performed.Bootstrapping is a nonparametric way of estimat-
ing -standarderrors by resampling the data.23 We draw random samples with
replacement from the initial pool of residuals. With these samples and the ini-
tial parameter estimates, artificial observations of the dependent variables are
formed. Using the constructed data, new regressions are then run. An empiri-
cal distribution of the parameters is then formed by repeating this procedure
many times.24
More specifically, bootstrapping attempts to estimate the true distribution
of the parameters from the empirical distribution of the residuals.The pro-
cedure, however, is only valid if the assumption that the true errors are iid
holds. Moreover, the validity of inferences based on bootstrapping remains
sensitive to the particular sample chosen. If the sample distribution of the resi-
duals is very far from the true distribution, then the bootstrap may contain lit-
tie additional information. This would be the case if, for example, there was a
small probability of a large dollar depreciation that we know ex post did not
occur in the sample.
4.1. BANDWAGON EXPECTATIONS
Here we consider the hypothesis obtained whenin equations (13), (14),
See for example. Freedman and Peters (1984).
In this paper, bootstrap repetitions are performed 1000 times.- 24-
and(15) is replaced by the past value of the spot rate. In equation (13) for
expected depreciation, this would give us equation (2). in which the bandwagon
parameter was called g (the equivalent of —fl1inthe general case).Negative
weight on past values of the spot rate implies extrapolative or 'bandwagon'
expectations. while a positive weight implies that expectations are stable and
conform to a distributed lag formulation. Table 4a presents the direct and
indirect regression results using the forward discount, the traditional measure
of expected depreciation.
To begin, we look for bandwagon effects by regressing the forward discount
and the ex post change in the spot rate directly on the lagged change in the
spot rate, comparable to equations (13) and (14).The results are presented
in the first two panels of Table 4a. The top panel shows the results of regress-
ing the forward discount on current and past levels of the spot rate. Here
> 0, indicating that the forward discount puts positive weight on past levels
of the spot rate. Since the data are irregularly spaced and thus are not true
time series, values of Durbin-Watson d test must be interpreted with caution.
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of no 'serial' correlation is still appropriate.
and the low reported values of d suggest that we could reject such a hypothesis.
We attempt to minimize the serial correlation problem by allowing each
country's residuals in the SUB regression to follow an AB(1) process. While we
do find borderline evidence of serial correlation, the coefficients are similar in
size and significance to the uncorrected SUB regression, and so the results are
no,t reported here.Thus, after taking account of the unconditional bias
reflected in the highly significant as. the forward discount is closer to a distri-
buted lag than to a bandwagon. The finding is that, in this context, expecta-
tions are inelastic.
In the middle panel of Table 4a, we regress the actual change in the spot- 25-
rateon the current and lagged level of the spot rate. We cannotreject P2=
i.e.,the random walk hypothesis. As we havementioned, this is a common
result.Within the framework of equations (13)-(15). thefinding that the for-
ward discount puts more weight on the past level of thespot rate than the spot
rate process itself, seems to be prftna facie evidence that theforward rate puts
"too much" weight on s1tobe a rational expectation.
Whether rational expectations holds is precisely thequestion the indirect
regression in the bottom panel is intended to answer. In none of theseregres-
sions, which are comparable to equation (15) above,can we reject the
hypothesis that=0.At first glance this seems inconsistent withfinding
> 0, and =0.But the tendency of the forward discount to followa
significant though slight distributed lag is overwhelmed by the muchgreater
volatility of the spot rate. Thus although the forward discount followsa distri-
buted lag, it still places enough weight on the currentspot rate to avoid a sta-
tistical rejection of rational expectations.
One might reasonably ask whether this is avery powerful test of rational
expectations. Since there is only slight evidence thatis an important fac-
tor in determining either expectations or the future spot rate!a finding of =0
in the indirect regression may not tell us much about therationality of expec-
tations. But in any case, the failure to reject does notimply that expectations
as given by the forward discount are rational since the constant term is
significantly different from zero, as one would expect from the finding of uncon-
ditional bias reported in the previous section.
Table 4b reports corresponding sets of regressions using thesurvey data
for expected depreciation. In the top panel we again find evidence of distri-
buted lag effects in the formation of expectations i.e.,fl> 0(though only in the
AMEX data). As before, we cannot reject the hypothesis thatfl20in the direct- 26-
testsof the spot process itself. Similarly, we cannot reject the rational expec-
tations constraint fi= Uin the indirect tests.
Taking the results of Tables 4a and 4b together, there is nothing to show
that expectations are systematically extrapolative. To the contrary, expecta-
tions as measured by the forward discount or the survey data seem to exhibit
more significant stability than does the actual spot rate. But it may still be
true that psychological factors are important.While apparent bandwagon
effects could be the result of speculative bubbles in the data, the absence of
such effects does not rule out bubbles. Speculative bubbles which are con-
stantly forming and popping would not yield systematic bandwagon effects in
the spot rate. And stochastic bubbles can even be consistent with a constant
rate of expected depreciation, as pointed out by Dornbusch (1982).
4.2. ADAPTIVE KXPECFATIONS
A second potential candidate to replace z in equation (13) is the previous
period's expected depreciation, which would give us equation (3). Now p1
becomesy. In Tables 5a and 5b this alternative specification is tested using
the forward discount and survey data, respectively, as proxies for expectations.
Regressions using AMEX data are omitted because gaps in the survey dates do
not permit the construction of enough observations with lagged expectations.
Turning first to the direct regressions, there is evidence that the forward
discount (Table 5a) can be viewed as placing weight on lagged forward rates,
The survey data (Table bb), however, seem to put little weight on prior predic-
tions. Because serial correlation is likely to be a problem, we correct the SUR
estimates for first order serial correlation. This procedure yields a significantly
positive coefficient in the forward discount regression. From the middle panels
of Tables 5a and 5b, we can see that the optimal predictor of the future spot- 27-
ratealso gives weight to past expectations. The evidenceis, however, not very
cornpeUingsthce the random walk hypothesis can be rejected inonly one of the
3 data sets.
In the indirect regressions of Tables 5a and Sb, there isno evidence that
expectations are insufficiently adaptive, i.e. that > 0. For one data set (CONII
S Month) expectations actually appear to be overlyadaptive, to place too much
weight on the current spot rate to be rational. Once again the constantterms,
particularly in the survey data regressions, are significantly positive1indicating
a failui-e of rational expectations.25
4.3.REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS
Wenext consider the possibility that expectations are determinedby the
current deviation from long-run equilibriumThus x in equations (13), (14).
and (15) now becomes ,thelong-run equilibrium value of the spot rate, as in
equation (4), with i=1 —fl1. Acomplete consideration of what determines çis
beyond the scope of a paper on exchange rate expectations. Herewe interpret
the long-run value in two separate ways.
The simplest 'possible description of the long-run equilibrium is that itis
constant over our sample. Thus we regress the left hand side variables inequa-
tions (13). (14). and (15) on the current spot rate and a constant term. The
results are presented in Tables 6a and Sb. A second specification for thelong-
run value of the exchange rate is purchasing power parity. In thiscase, §is
not constant but rather moves with relative inflation differentials, Moreirnpor-
tantly, when the regressions are run without a constant term, such a measure
of 1 based on a reference period like the 1970's, implies thatthroughout the
Serial correlation appears less prevalent in the indirect regressions than in the direct
regressions. If it were present, it would in itself constitute a rejection of the null hypothesis
of rational erpectations, and no correction would be needed.- 26-
1981-84in-sample period the dollar would be expected to depreciate, not just in
those months when the dollar happens to have Seen above its 1961-84 average.
These regressions are reported in Tables 7a and 7b.
The general conclusions that come out of Tables 6 and 7 are the same.
First, expectations as measured by the surveys are strongly regressive in the
Economist data. The estimates ofare not significant in the AMEX survey data
and are even of incorrect sign. However, this is partly an artifact of including
the 1981- 1984 dummy variables, which in both tables show large, positive shifts
in the long-run value of the dollar. When the dummies are removed, andis
forced to remain constant (o evolve slowly with inflation differentials), the
coefficients become significantly positive (results not reported).The direct
regressions of the Economist survey data in Tables Sb and 7b show that the
spot rate is expected to eliminate 20 to 30 percent of the deviation from PFP
within a year.26 Second, the forward discount is not significantly regressive, and
the point estimates are decidedly smaller in magnitude than those for the sur-
vey data. Third, looking at the indirect equations in the bottom panels, there is
evidence that survey expectations are overly-regressive, tending to predict a
more rapid return to long-run equilibrium than is rational, beyond that implied
by the significantly positive constant terms. The forward rate does not appear
to have this element of irrationality since fi= 0cannot be rejected in the
indirect regressions in Tables Ga and 7a.
The finding of regressive expectations, like the findings of distributed-lag
or adaptive (as opposed to bandwagon or static) expectations in the preceding
two sections, says that the expected future spot rate is relatively inelastic with
respect to the contemporaneous spot rate- Because a current increase in the
For example, in Table 6b, the case of a constant long-run equilibrium exchange rate
the SUR regression on the 3 month dta set shows deviations from PPP are expected to de-
cay at an annual rate of (1 -0.9457)r19percent, and the ECONif data shows an expect-
ed annual rate of decay of (1 -0.8559)= 27percent.- 29 -
valueof a currency generates expectations of future depreciation! speculators
will tend to dampen the original increase. Speculation is stabilizing. Our
finding is that if expectations were rational, they would be more elastic, put
more weight on the contemporaneous spot rate, which has the implication that
overshooting would be greater than it is.27 -
4.4.PPP EXPECTATIONS
Jt is also possible to think ofin equations (13)-(15) as the level of the
futurespot ratewhichfirstdifferencesof PPP would predict,
+ EZI — Ifex ante FPF held, expectations would give zero weight
to the contemporaneous spot rate alone (fl1=1) and a weight of one to
÷ E[ 1r÷1 —ir÷1].Similarly, if expectations follow a random walk, i.e. are
perfectly inelastic, with respect to changes in relative inflation rates, then the
contemporaneous spot rate would get full weight and no importance would be
attached to an inflation-adjusted prediction of the future spot rate.Equation




Tables Ba and Sb report tests of FPP expectations.29 Looking at the direct
regressions of expected spot rate changes, it is clear that, in forming their
27Frankel(1983) shows theoretically that if expectations were more elastic with respect
to the contemporaneous spot rate and less elastic with respect to other factors, as would
bethe case under rational expectations according to Tables 61, and 7b, the degree of
overshooting in the Dornbusch model would be increased. Findings of 'excessive specula-
tion' in the sense of Bilson, as in the statistically more significant results reported in the
next section, have the same implication (p. 43): the nature of observed failure of rational
expectations is to rpdi,rovershootingnot to increase it.
See the Data Appendix for a description of the estimates of expected inflation we use
in this paper.
29Unlikein the preceding regressions we constrain the intercepts to be equal across
currencies in the equations with expected inflation, for three reasons: (1) the paucity of
data points makes it desirable to conserve degrees of freedom; (2) Expected inflation
differentials tend to vary more across countries than across time; (3) The data are more
amenable to the constraint that the constant terms are equal across countries here than
for the other equations.- 30-
expectations,investors put a large and significant weight on the FPP predictor
of the future spot rate. Using either the forward discount or the survey data, in
seven regressions it is not possible to reject fl1= 1,the PPP expectations
hypothesis. The AMEX data regressions however, show a clear rejection of both
the static expectations and the FPF expectations hypotheses.30 In the middle
panels of Tables Ba and Sb we cannot reject the hypothesis that the actual spot
process conforms to PPP.
In the indirect regressions there is no statistically significant potential for
using the published survey numbers to improve on exchange rate forecasts, i.e.,
we are again unable to reject rational expectations but for the constant term.
4.b. INFLATION-ADJUSTED REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS
In Tables 9a and 9b we again consider regressive expectations, this time in
the context of a secular inflation diflerential that causes ä to change over
time. In models with non-zero steady state growth of nominal prices and
money, it is the real exchange rate as in equation (6) that should exhibit a ten-
dency to regress to the long-run equilibrium, E. A test of inflation-adjusted
regressive expectations can be interpreted in terms of the general equations
(13)-(15) as a test of whether investors' expectations of the future j
exchange rate puts the correct weight, if any, on the long-run equilibrium.
°Noticethat, under the assumtion of covered interest parity, the direct regressions of
the forward discount in Table Ba also can be interpreted as tests of real interest rate
parity, In all the forward discount regressions the hypothesis a1 =0,fl1= 1,and
dumznyO can be rejected. indicating that real interest parity fails.The Economist re-
gressions indicate that the real interest differential 1981-85 is significantly positive, a;-
proximately 1.5 percent per annum.
(.c.-31-
Such a test also provides a meaningful alternative to the ax ante PPP
hypothesis, the proposition that investors expect the real exchange rate to fol-
low a random walk. In the direct regressions of expectations using the forward
rate in Table 9a there is no evidence that expectations, measured by the
inflation-adjusted forward discount are regressive.31 Survey data expe ctations
(TabLes 9b), however, demonstrate a tendency for expectations to predict a
return to the long-run equilibrium. The estimates of ii are significant for the
196 1-85 Economist data set. They are not significant for the AMEX data set, but
are somewhat better than under the tests of simple regressive expectations
without any secular inflation term.
4.6. TESFS OF EXUESSWE SPECUlATION -
Anotherpossible repLacement forin equations (13)-(15) is the expected
future spot rate itself, giving us equations (10) and (10'), with d =fi. Weare
thus asking whether investors put the correct weight on the contemporaneous
spot rate versus all other factors that enter their expectations, whatever they
may be. Equation (13) now becomes an algebraic identity, with=1.Further-
more, equations (14) and (15) have identical statistical properties, with a =—a2
and fi=
Table lOa uses the forward discount as the expectational variable. The
results are similar to the many aLready published. in three of the five equa-
tions, we can reject the null hypothesis of simple forward market efficiency. In
the top panel of Table lOb we regress the survey expectational error on the
survey expected depreciation. Here we can reject the null hypothesis even
more strongLy than in the previous table, ba. All five data sets yield
significantly positive slope parameters. The optimal predictor would place less
31Becauseof the low yaue of the Durbth-Watson d statistics, the forward discount
results should be interpreted with caution.- 32-
thanfull weight on the survey expectation and would place some weight instead
on the contemporaneous spot rate.
Recall that a rejection of d= 0in equation (10), which is the common
finding if the forward discount is used as a proxy for expectations, can be
explained by two alternative hypotheses. One is that investors should fraction-
ally reduce their expectations in order that they be rational: in Bilson's
(1981b) terminology, there is excessive speculation. The other is that there is a
time-varying risk premium which allows the variance of expectations rationally
to exceed the variance of the forward discount. If, however, the survey data are
used as expectations, the alternative of a time-varying risk premium is elim-
inated, and we are left with a single, unambiguous alternative hypothesis: a
failure of rational expectations in the form of excessive speculation.- 33-
5.CONCLUSIONS
To summarize our findings:
(1) Exchange rate expectations are not static. The observed nonzero forward
discount numbers, far from being attributable to a risk premium, have
stated the degree of expected dollar depreciation during the recent
period.Our results tend to undermine the claims of Fama. Hodrick and
Srivastava. and Bilson (1985) that the variance in the risk premium exceeds the
variance in expected depreciation.
(2) Exchange rate expectations are also not extrapolative. We find that the
elasticity of the expected future spot rate with respect to the current spot rate
is significantly less than unity;expectations put positive weight on the
"other factor", regardless whether it is the lagged spot rate (distributed lag
expectations), lagged expected rate (adaptive expectations), the forward rate,
the long-run equilibrium rate (regressive expectations) or the predictions of ex
ante PFP. The general finding of inelastic expectations is important because it
implies that a current increase in the spot exchange rate itself generates anti-
cipations of a future decrease, as in the overshooting model, which tends to
moderate the extent of the original increase, Speculation is stabilizing.
(3) Often the actual spot exchange rate process is close to a random walk.
Combined 'with point (1). this would suggest that expectations are excessively
speculative in the sense of Bilson (1981b). Indeed the common finding that
prediction errors are significantly correlated with the expected rate of depreci-
ation is upheld even more strongly when we measure expectations with the sur-
vey data than with the traditional forward discount. Thus we are able to reject
rational expectations, a finding that holds also when we use the bootstrapping- 34-
techniqueto estimate the standard errors. When forming their expectations,
investors would do better to put more weight on the contemporaneous spot
rate. This is the same result that Bilson and many others have found with for-
ward market data; but now that we have found it in the expectationalsurvey
data, it cannot be attributed to a risk premium.- 35-
6.DATA APPENDIX
In this appendix we brieñy describe the construction of the AMEX and
Economist data sets more specifically.
The Economist Financial Review has conducted 24 surveys beginning in
June, 1981.Surveys took place on a specific day on which the foreign exchange
markets were open. Respondents were asked for their expectations of the value
of five currencies (the pound. French franc, mark, Swiss franc, and yen) against
the dollar in 3 months and 6 months time. We matched a given day's survey
results with that day's actual rates, and with actual rates as close to 90 and 180
days later as possible. Data points which did not overlap by more than afew
days were grouped into separate data sets. Survey dates, the horizon dates,
and the data set separation scheme are all reported in Table Al.
The Amex Bank Review has conducted 11 surveys beginning in January,
1976. Respondents were asked for their expectations of the value of the same
five currencies in 6 months time. The first 3 surveys, however, included only
the pound and the mark.Future foreign exchange market realizations were
matched in a manner similar to that used for the Economist data. Amex Bank
surveys were conducted by mail, and hence it was impossible to pick specific
days which were used by all respondents as reference points with any degree of
certainty. Since exchange rates vary so much within a month, two methods of
choosing the contemporaneous spot rate were employed. First, single days
within the survey period were selected (AMEX DAY data set). Second, 30 day
averages of daily rates were constructed to encompass the entire survey period
(AMEX MONTH data set). The days and averages used are reported in Table A2.
Since both methods gave very similar quantitative results in the body of the
paper, the lack of a precise reference point should not arouse much concern.- 36-
Actualmarket spot and forward rates were taken from DRJ. Theyrepresent
the average of the morning bid and ask rates from New York. Interestrates are
calculated as the average of the bid• and ask rates forEurocurrency




where is the Euro-bill rate on dollars at time t to mature at time t+k, and
is the corresponding rate for a foreign currency.
The purchasing power parity level of any foreigncurrency against the dol-





wheres0 is the log of the average nominal value of that currency in terms of
dollars, 1973-1979, P and P are the current monthly levels of the US and
foreign CPIs respectively, and P0 and P are the average levels of the US and
foreign CPJ5, 1973-1979.
Lagged exchange rates (used for "bandwagon' expectations) are market
rates approximately 90 days before survey dates, These dates arereported in
the last columns of Table Al and Table A2.
Relative inflation differentials were taken from two separate sources. In
addition to expected depreciation, AMEX surveys also reported respondents'
estimates of expected inflation for the U.S.. U. K., West Germany, and, in several
surveys, France. These observations match precisely the date and horizon (6
months) of the AMEX exchange rate expectations. The Economistsurvey does
not include respondents' expectations of inflation. Instead DRI forecasts of- 37-
inflationfor the U. S.. Ti. K.. France, West Germany, and Japan were used. Fore-
casts were performed at approximately the same time as the surveys were
taken (the dates are given in the second-to-last column of Table Al). DRI
inflation forecasts are reported at 3 year horizons, and have a slightly different
interpretation than the AMEX expected inflation: expected inflation can be
thought of as representing the longer-run secular trend in relative price levels.- 38-
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DATES USED Ii CONSTRUCT ECONOMIST DATA SETS
Approxitata 3—Month 6—Month OR! Inflation
SurveyData * ForwardDateForwardDate Forecast Date
23—Jzn—91 * *4 21—Sep—81 18—Dec—81 Jun—81
03—Aug—31 30—Oct—81 29—Jan—82 Jul—91
15—Seo—31I HI 14—Dec—81 12—Mar—82 Sep—91
27—Oct—81 25-Jan-82 23-Apr-82 NA
09—Dec—314 *4 08—Mar—82 04—Jun—82 Jan—92
19—Apr—82* *44 19—Jul—92 15—Oct—92 Apr—82
01—Jun—324! 31—Aug—82 29—Nov—92 Jul—92
23-Aug—92* 22—Nov—92 22—Mar-83 Aug—82
16—Nov—82* 1*4 14—Feb—83 13—May—93 Nov—82
03—Jan—83 *4 01—Apr—93 01—Jul—83 Dec—92
14—Feb—93 * 13-May—93 12—Aug—33 Mar-93
28—Mar—83 24—Jun—33 23—Sep—83 NA
09—May—93 *4* 05—Aug—83 04—Nov—83 NA
21-Jun—33 * 4* 19—Sep—83 16—Dec—83
01—Aug—93 28—Oct—83 27—Jan—84 NA
24—act—as *14* 20—Jan—84 20—Apr—84 Oct—83
06—Dec—93 05—Mar—84 01—Jun—84 Oec—83
24—Jan—84 * It 23—Apr—84 20—Jul—84 Jan—84
05—Mar—84 01—Jun—84 31—Aug—84 NA
29—May—84* 4*4 27—Aug—84 23—Nov-84 May—94
21—Aug—84* *4 19—Nov—84 05—Mar-85 Sep—94
14—Dec—84 4 4*4 14—Mar—95 12—Jun—OS Dec—84
05—Feb—85 06—May—OS 04—Aug—95 Feb—85
19—Mar—95$4* 17—Jun—85 15—Sep—85 Mar—85
4The day on which the Econotist FinancialReview conducted their survey.
IIndicates that the 3 aonth horizon survey observation was used in the ECON 3 Month data set.
4$ indicates that the 6 &cnth horizon survey observation was used in the ECON 6 Month data set.
*4* Indicates that the 6 ianth horizon survey observation was used in the ECONII 6 Month data set.Table A2








AMEX DAY DATES *
31—Oct—75 30—Jul—76
30—Jul—76 It 31—Jan—77. 30—Apr—là










Survey Date I Forward Date Lag Date
MEl MONTH DATESI
From Ta From To From To
01—Jan—76 31—Jan—76 *4 01—Jul—76 31—Jul—76 01—Nov—75 30—Nov—75
01—Jul—76 31—Jul—76 4* 01—Jan—77 31—Jan—77 30-Apr—76 30—flay—là
01—Jan—77 31—Jan—77 *4 01—Jul—fl 31—Jul—fl 31—Oct—76 29—flay—là
16—Jun—fl15—Jul—77 16—Dec—77 15—Jan—78 19—Mar—77 16—Apr—fl
16—Nov—fl15—Dec—77 16—May—7815—Jun—TB 17—Aug—77 16—Sep—fl
01—Jun—78 30—Jun—78 01—Dec—78 31—Dec-78 01—Apr—78 01—May—i
16—Nov—78 15—Dec—78 16—May—79 15—Jun—79 17—Aug—78 16—Sep—78
16—Jun—81 15—Jul—B! 16—Dec—81 15—Jan—82 18—Mar—81 16—April
16—Jun—82 15—Jul—52 16-Dec—82 15—Jan—83 18—Mar—82 16—Apr12
16—Jun—83 15—Jul—83 16—Dec—83 15—Jan—84 18—Mar—83 16—Apr—63
16—Jun—84 15—Jul—84 16—Dec—84 15—Jan—85 18—Mar—84 16—Apr14
* Because eachAMEX suneytookplaceover2 to 4 weeks, two differentsets olmarket
referencedates were used. The first is asingle day approximating the survey date, and
thesecond uses averages overcorresponding30 day periods.
St Suveys included only the pound andthemark.P8LE 1
COmPARISON OF VARIANCES OF Etds(1+1)j AND RP(t)
(in percent per annua)
Data Set Appraxiaate Yar(Etds(t+1JJ)
Dates N Var(dsltffll Var(fd(t)) Var(E[ds(t+t)l1 Var(rp(tJl
—Var(rp(tfl
EDH3 MCMTH t 1981—25 70 4.230 0.060 0.458 0.448 0.009
lix 14 2.703 0.051 0.965 0.987 —0.022
FR - 14 4.792 0.117 0.392 0.297 0.085
14 4.003 0.020 0.371 0.366 0.005
SW 14 6.053 0.040 0.352 0.363 —0.011
14 14 3.517 0.074 0.219 0.229 —0.010
ECON 6 MOMIHU 1981—25 40 1.170 0.066 0.234 0.105 0.048
UK 8 0.713 0.036 0.168 0.188 -0.01?
FR 8 0.932 0.199 0.390 0.207 0.103
8 0.998 0.013 0.238 0.212 0.025
SW 8 2.442 0.034 0.220 0.2:0 -0.010
JA 8 0.764 0.047 0.152 0.091 0.061
ECONII6 MONTH 1981—85 30 1.5:6 0.012 0.129 0.136 —0.008
UK 6 0.584 0.017 0.132 0.141 —0.009
FR 6 0.804 0.05! 0.230 0.199 0.031
W6 6 1.250 0.016 0.064 0.106 —0.042
SW 6 2.484 0.035 0.179 0.205 —0.026
JA 6 2.55? 0.092 0.035 0.031 0.005
AMEX DAY 1976—84 46 2.635 0.094 0.313 0.164 0.148
UK 11 2.094 0.145 0.227 0.050 0.176
FR 8 1.813 0.085 0.117 0.031 0.086
11 2.120 0.052 0.273 0.164 0.110
SW 8 4.267 0.077 0.513 0.335 0.177
JA 0 2.020 0.109 0.434 0.242 0.192
AMEX MONTH 1976—84 46 2.563 0.094 0.273 0.133 0.140
UK 11 2.61 0.157 0.270 0.073 0.197
FR 3 1.693 0.076 0.155 0.075 0.000
11 1.894 0.052 0.32? 0.207 0.121
SW 8 4.173 0.017 0.412 0.247 0.165
JA . B 2.423 0.108 0.199 0.064 0.135
t Farvar(ds, N=65 It Forvar(ds), N:35
ds(t+1)—
logpercentage depreciation of the dollar over following period.
ECON3 Monthdata are expected spat rates at three sonth horizons. The survey dates are:
6723/31, 9/15/81,12/8/81,4/19/82,8/W82, 11/16/82, 2/14/83, 6121/83, 10/24/83, 1/24/34,
3/29/84, 9/21/84, 12/14/84, 3/19/85.
ECON6Month data are at 6 ionth horizons after the following survey dates:
6/23/01,
12/3/01, 6/1/82, 1/3/83, 6/21/83, 1/24/84, 8/21/84, 3/19/85.
500911 & survey dates comprise a second grouping of 6 ianthnon—overlappingresponses:
9/15/81, 4/19/02, 11/16/82, 5/9/83, 10/24/83, 5/29/84, 12/14(84, 3/19/85.
AMEXDAYdata are at 6 ionth horizons alter the following approxitate survey dates: 1/30/76,
7/30/76, 1/31/77, 6/30/77, 12/1/77, 6/30/78, 12/1/70, 6/30/81, 6/30/02, 6/30/83, 6/29/04.
AMEX MONTH data are at 6 ionUt horizons after the foliowing approxiiate averaged
survey
dates: 1/1/76—1/31/76, 7/1/76—7/31/76, 1/1/771/31/77,6/16/17—7/15/77,11/16/77—12/15/77,
6/1/78—6130/75,11/16/70—12/15/73,6/16/31—7/15/81, 6/15/82— 7/15/82,6/16/83—7/15/83,6/16/84—7/15/84.TABLE ía
COMPARISON OF MEN SURED ABSOLUTE VALUE OF Etdst+I)] AND RP(t)
(in percent per annua)
Data Set Approxiaate
Dates N MSAV(ds(t+1fl MSAV(fdW) NSAV(Etds(t+t)]) MSAV(rp(t))
ECON 3 MONTHS 198115 70 4.930 0.263 1.452 0.965
ECON 6 NONTUU 1981—95 40 2.762 0.276 1.235 0.732
ECCNII 6 MONTH 1981—85 30 2.109 0.265 1.105 O.56í
AMEX DAY 1976-84 46 2.754 0.278 0.422 0.222
AMEX MONTH 1974—84 46 2.648 0.290 0.451 0.216
AMEX DAY LATE 1981—84 20 2.444 0.3fl 0.623 0.198
AMEX MONTH LATE1981—84 20 2.537 0.324 0.808 0.269
* Far MSAV(ds(t41fl, N65
1* For MSAV(ds(t+Lfl, @35
AMEX DAY LATE survey dates are:6/30/81,6/30/82, 6/30/83,6/30/84.
AMEXMONTH LATE surveydatesare: 6/16/B1—7/15/81
6116182—1/15/82,6/16/83—7/15/83,6/16/84—7/15184.Table 2
VARIOUS MEASURES OF EXPE:tD DEPRECIATION
OVER THE FOLLOWING MONTHS
CX percent per annug)
SURVEY DATA FORWARD INTEREST ACTuAL
DISCOUNT PARITY CHANGE
Data Set Appraxiiate ElsItti]]— s(t+1)—
dates N s(tl flU—sit] i—it s(tl Ut
SOON 3 MONTH 1 1991-35 70 7.55 2.29 2.10 -9.64
UK 14 6.30 o.sa 0.43 —16.19
FR 14 4.72 —4.65 —3.99 —[2.85
1412.49 4.29 3.89 —6.76
SW 1412.12 6.14 5.61 —5.69
1412.14 5.03 4.56 —1.71
ECON6 MONTH$$ 199115 40 9.29 2.05 1.94 —[2.61
UK 8 3.92 0.39 0.28 —17.46
FR 8 4.60 —5.44 —4.93 —17.23
WG 8 12.81 4.28 4.00 —10.37
SW 9 12.35 5.87 5.55 —10.71
JR 312.71 5.16 4.78
ECON!! 6 MONTH 1981—95 30 9.04 2.51 2.35 —7.91
UK 6 5.59 1.19 1.11 —10.78
FR 6 2.42 —5.52 —5.09 —14.76
WE 6 12.83 4.69 4.39 —7.23
SW 6 [2.00 6.70 6.22 -4.97
JR 612.36 5.4? 5.12 —1.81
AMEX DAY 6 MONTH 1976—84 46 3.57 2.45 2.59 3.98
UK 11 1.39 —1.52 —1.50 —3.40
FR 9 2.13 —2.72 —2.37 —0.56
WG 11 4.85 4.07 3.82 5.81
SW 8 3.54 6.92 6.50 12.0G
34 8 5.94 5.50 6.50 6.03
AJIEX MONTH 6 MONTH 1976—84 46 4.26 2.45 2.54 3.31
UK 11 1.93 —1.63 —1.67 —4.53
FR 3 2.90 —2.61 —2.39 —1.54
WE 11 5.27 4.10 3.94 5.00
SW 9 4.62 6.86 6.47 11.23
JR 8 6.69 5.59 6.47 6.38
AMEX DAY LATE 1981—84 20 6.74 3.80 3.55 —5.06
UK 4 6.11 2.56 2.24 —15.14
FR 4 2.25 —3.36 —2.31 —10.07
WE 410.30 5.46 5.07 —5.18
SW 4 6.31 7.56 7.00 0.90
JR 4 8.73 6.77 6.25 4.13
AMEX MONTH LATE 1981—84 20 8.03 3.89 3.61 -4.98
UK 4 7.20 2.45 2.13 —15.98
FR 4 3.68 —2.84 —2.57 —9.86
We 411.77 5.57 5.15 -4.99
SW 4 8.25 7.4-4 6.92 1.72
JR 4 9.25 6.84 6.37 4.19
S For s(t+12J—s(t), N:65 ** For slt+12)—s(t), N35
11* sCttL2)—slti does not include final survey obeservation.Table 3
UNCONDITIONAL BIAS OF VARIOUS NESURES OF EXPECTED CHANGES
IN THE SPOT RATE




Data SetApprcxinte N MEAN SDoft stat MEAN SDoft stat MEAN SOoft stat
Dates MEAN MEAN MEAN
ECON 3 MONTH 1981—85 65 19.3 2.8 6.36 11.0 2.5 4.36 10.3 2.5 4.29
IlK 13 24.0 5.9 4.09 17.1 4.7 3.67 16.? 4.6 3.65
FR 13 16.3 6.4 2.87 8.0 6.1 1.31 8.7 6.1 1.47
13 20.5 6.2 3.30 11.1 5.6 1.98 10.7 5.6 1.91
SW 13 19.1 7.5 2.55 12.0 6.3 1.77 11.5 6.9 1.69
JA 13 21.2 6.1 3.48 6.9 5.4 1.28 6.4 5.4 1.19
ECON6 MONTH 1981—85 35 22.6 2.0 11.11 14.8 1.8 8.29 14.6 1.8 8.26
DX 7 22.1 3.9 5.61 18.2 3.4 5.29 18.1 3.4 5.26
FR 7 22.2 3.9 5.68 11.3 3.3 3.47 11.9 3.3 3.63
NO 7 24.3 4.5 5.34 14.8 4.0 3.71 14.5 3.9 3.67
SW 7 24.1 7.1 3.37 17.1 5.9 2.94 16.7 5.8 2.36
JA 7 20.6 3.7 5.56 12.4 3.4 3.61 12.! 3.4 3.53
ECONI! 6 MONTE 1981—95 30 17.0 2.4 7.20 10.4 2.3 4.51 10.3 2.3 4.46
DX 6 16.4 4.3 3.78 12.0 3.2 3.79 11.9 3.1 3.32
FR 6 17.2 3.8 4.54 9.2 4.1 2.26 9.7 4.1 2.35
NO 6 20.1 4.7 4.28 11.9 4.8 2.47 11.6 4.8 2.41
SW 6 17.0 7.1 2.39 11.7 6.7 1.73 11.2 6.7 1.66
JA 6 14.2 7.2 1.97 7.3 7.5 0.98 6.9 7.4 0.94
AMEX DAY 197614 46 —0.1 2.8 —0.04 —1.3 2.5-4.53 —1.2 2.4 —0.49
DX 11 4.8 5.7 0.65 1.9 5.6 0.33 1.9 5.6 0.34
FR 8 2.7 4.9 0.55 —2.2 4.9 —0.44 —1.8 4.9 —0.37
NO 11 —1.0 5.3 —0.18 —1.7 4.7 —0.37 —2.0 4.6 —0.43
SW 8 —8.5 9.3 —0.91 —5.1 7.9 —0.65 —5.5 7.8 —0.70
JA 8 —0.1 6.7 —0.01 —0.5 5.8 —0.09 0.5 5.2 0.09
AMEX MONTH 1976—84 46 1.3 2.7 0.46 —0.6 2.4 —0.25-0.6 2.4 —0.23
UK 11 6.4 5.5 1.15 2.8 5.4 0.53 2.9 5.4 0.53
FR 8 4.4 4.7 0.95 —1.1 4.7 —0.23 -P0.9 L7 —0.18
NO 11 0.3 5.2 0.05 —0.9 4.5 —0.20 —1.2 4.4 -0.26
SW 8 —6.6 9.0 -0.74 —4.4 7.7 —0.56 —4.3 7.7 —0.62
JA 8 0.3 6.4 0.051.8 6.2 —0.13 0.1 5.7 0.01
AMEXDAY LATE 1981—84 20 11.8 3.4 3.42 8.9 3.2 2.77 8.6 3.2 2.69
AMEXMONTH LATE 1981—84 20 13.0 3.4 3.79 8.9 3.2 2.77 8.6 3.2 2.67TABLE 4a
BANDWAGON EXPECTATIONS / indeoendent variable: sit—I) —sit)
EURUARO DISCOUNT REGRESSIONS
DirectRegression ol Expected Change: 1(t) — sit) = a+blE sit—i) — sit)
——_______ a(uk)aiir) a(wg) a(sw) a{ia) 81—84 bI OW BE t:51:i) r2





ECCN3 Month .0000 -0.01440.00950.0)520.0126 0.0492 0.99 59 3.88 *1023 0.00160.00160.00160.00150.0015 0.0127
SOON6 Month 0.0013 —0.03330.01990.03030.0282 0.0984 1.12 29 3.75 11 0.95 0.0041 0.00420.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0262
ECONII6 onth —0.0014 —0.03410.01990.02990.0253 0.1455 1.18 242.72 II0.89 0.00460.00450.00400.00400.0038 0.0534
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.0107 —0.02000.01660.03040.02500.00530.0932 1.70 39 1.90 0.74
0.00450.00530.00440.00540.00560.00550.0489
AMEX6 Month (Month) —0.01)8 —0.0197 0.01680.0296 0.0246220.00600.0886 1.63 39 1.55 0.73
0.00450.00530.00450.0054 0.0056870.00610.0573
Direct Regression o4 ActualChange:s(t+1) — sit)a +b2(sEt—i) —s(t)I
Ouny
a(uk) a(fr) awg) alsw) a(ja) 81—84 b2 OW OFt:b2=0 r2
SUR Regression —0.0414 —0.0331 —0.0175 —0.0145 -0.0044 0.0215 59 0.17 .00 5
Asyiptotic se's 0.01320.01520.01430.01790.0136 0.1241
OLSRegressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0473 —0.0390 —0.0213 —0.0162 —0.0054 0.1500 1.98 59 1.26 0.16
0.01520.01520.01460.01430.0142 0.1192
ECON 6 Month —0.0924 —0.0935 4.0562 —0.0555 -0.0327 0.2071 2.22 29 1.61 0.61
0.02020.02040.02010.01990.0200 0.1288
ECONII 6 Month —0.0294 —0.0519 —0.0243 —0.0126 —0.0017 —0.4057 2.63 24 —1.37 0.32
0.03060.02950.02630.02640.0254 0.3539
AMEX 6 Month (Day) 0.00850.039!0.05670.09510.0600 0.0605 0.2059 39 —1.15 0.31
0.02260.02670.02230.02710.0283 0.02770.2477
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.00240.03000.05060.09070.0644 —0.0638 —0.1385 1.94 39 —0.47 0.26
0.02310.02720.02290.02780.02910.03140.2930
Indirect Regression: fit) — s(t+1)a + hisit—I) —sEt)
Duny
a(uk)atfr) a(Na) a(sw)aljalBl—04 b O OFt:b0 r2
SUR Reqresston 0.04260.01990.02790.03010.0173 0.0019 59 0.02 0.00 $
Asyiptotic se's 0.01340.01550.01440.01770.0141 0.1238
Bootstrap se's 0.01290.01610.01430.01640.0134 0.1435 0.01
OLS Reqressions
ECOW3 Month 0.04730.02460.03030.03140.0180 4.1008 1.97 59 —0.33 0.2Q
0.01540.01540.01480.01450.0144 0.1210
LOON 6 Month 0.09370.06020.07610.00590.0609 —0.1097 2.30 29 0.22 0.65
0.02090.02110.02080.02060.0207 0.1332
ECONII 6 Month 0.02810.01780.04420.04250.0270 0.6312 2.54 24 1.67 0.39
0.03270.03160.02810.02820.0272 0.3703
AMEX6 Month (Day)—0.0191—0.0591 —0.0401 4.0647 -0.0351 0.06590.3791 1.92 39 1.47 0.26
0.02350.02790.02330.02830.02950.02890.2585
AMEX6 Month (Month) —0.0142 —0.0497 —0.0339 —0.0611 —0.03990.06990.2270 2.09 39 0.74 0.20
0.02430.02860.02410.02920.03060.03300.3081
t . U indirata cinnflranrn +and I? 1.,,.1 .TABLE 4b
BANC WAGON EXPECTATIONS / Indegendent variable: sit—i) —sit)
SURVEYOATh REGRESSIONS
Direct Regression of Expected Change: E Es(t+1)l —sit)=a+blisit—I) —sit) I
Du.iy
— aluk) aifrI a(wg) a(sw)a(ja) 81—84 OW OFt:bl:0 r2
SUR Reqression 0.02080.01500.03530.03380.0320 -4.0300 59 —107 0021 Asystotic se's 0.00610.00440.00260.0028 0.0031 0.0280
OLS Reqressions
WON 3 Month 0.02130.01540.03560.0340 0.0321 —.04Q0 1.79 59 —1.24 0 30 0.00410.0041 0.00400.00390.0038 0.0322
ECON 6 Month 0.0211 0.02160.06770.06540.0685 0.0840 2.09 29 1.51 085 0.00870.00880.0090 0.0086 0.0086 0.0557
ECUNII 6 Month 0.01790.00310.05930.05500.0588 0.2002 1.36 24 2.04 0.90 0.00850.00820.00730.00730.0070 0.0980
AMEX6 Month (Day)—0.0003 —0.00450.01530.00760.02350.01290.2140 2.86 39 2.76 1*0.56 0.0071 0.00840.00700.0085 0.00890.00870.0774
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.0003 —0.002?0.01630.01000.02330.01990.1912 2.48 39 2.4? 1* 0.70 0.00610.00710.00600.00730.00760.00820.0769
Direct Regression of Actual Change: sittli —sit)a +b2(sit—i) —sit)
Duny
aiuk) a(fr a(wg) a(sw) aiJa) 81—84 b2 OW OF t:b2:0 r2
SIJRReressjan —0.3414 -0.0331 —0.0175—0.0145 —0.0044 0.0215 59 0.17 .00 $ Asyiptoticse's 0.01320.01520.01430.01790.0136 0.1241
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0473 -0.0390 —0.0213 —1.0162 —0.0054 0.1500 1.98 59 1.26 0.16 0.0152 0.0152 0.01460.01430.0142 0.1192
ECON 6 Month —0.0924 —0.0935 —0.0542 —0.0555 —0.0327 0.2071 2.22 29 1.61 0.61 0.02020.02040.02010.01990.0200 0.1288
EC0NII6 Month —0.0294 —0.0519 —0.0243—0.0126 —0.0017 —0.4857 2.63 24 —1.37 0.32 0.03060.02950.02630.02640.0254 0.3539
AMEX6 Month (Day) 0.00850.03910.05670.09510.0600 —0.0605 4.2859 1.75 39 —1.15 0.31 0.02260.02670.02230.02710.02830.02770.2477
AMEX 6 Month (ilonth) 0.00240.03000.05060.09070.0644 —0.0639 —0.1385 1.94 39 —0.47 0.26 0.02310.02720.02290.02780.02910.03140.2930
Indirect Regression: S [sittl)] — s(t+1)a + bi sit—Il — sit))
Dujisy
aluk) a(frl a(g) a(sw) aiJa) 81—84 b OW OF t:b0 r2
SUR Regression 0.06750.05330.05620.04990.0373 —0.1657 59 1.29 0.03 $ Asyototjc se's 0.01630.01630.01540.01960.0155 0.1281
Bodttrap se's 0.01550.01630.01510.01840.0144 0.1474 1.12
01.5 Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0. 0686 0. 05440.0569 0. 0502 0.0375 —0. 1900 1.78 59 1.42 0.41
0.01700.01710.01640.01600.0160 0.1336
ECON 6 Month 0.11340.1151 0.12390.12080.1013 -4.1231 2.51 29 —0.79 0.76
0.0245 0.0249 0.02450.02420.0243 0.1567
ECONII 6 Month 0.04730.05510.08350.06760.0061 0.6859 2.37 24 1.79 0.63
0.03310.0319 0.02850.02860.0275 0.3827
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.0098 —0.0436 —0.04(4 —0.0875 1.0365 0.0733 0.4999 2.10 39 1.82 0.33
0.02500.02950.02470.03000.03130.03060.2740
AMEX 6 Month (Month) -0.0027 —0.032? —0.0343 —0.0807 —0.0411 0.08270.3294 2.07 39 1.06 0.33
0.02460.0239 0.02440.02960.03100.03340.3117
I ,Stindicate significance at 52 and it levels. r2 corresDonds to aooroTiaf! r f.c+e.. I1 LTABLE 5a
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS / tndeaendent variab1e f!t—l) —sCt)
F0RARODISCOUNT RE5AESSIONS
DirectRegression of ExpectedChange 4(t) — sit) a +bI(f(t—L) —sCt)
athk) a(fr) a(wgl a(sw)aWl bi OW DE t:blrO r2
SUB Regression 0.0004 —0.01260.01020.0150 0.0116 0.0217 54 2.46 ti o.io$ Asyiptotic se's 0.0011 0.00260.00110.00150.0016 0.0083
SUR Reoression with 0.000! —0.01240.010! 0.01510.0119 0.0344 54 4.99 U ARU) Correction 0.00070.00330.00080.00090.0019 o.oooy
Asyaptoticse's
AR(1) coefficient —0.33 0.63 —0.28 —0.43 0.27
015 Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0002 —0.01270.0101 0.01490.0116 0.0266 1.35 54 1.73 0.80 0.00170.00170.00170.00170.0017 0.0154
ECON 6 Month 0.0013 —0.03130.02200.0301 0.0243 —0.0017 1.42 24 —0.03 0.77 0.0069 0.0060 0.00640.00670.0063 0.0574
ECONII 6 Month 0.0042 —0.02850.02230.03290.0230 0.0037 1.74 19 0.11 0.85 0.00480.00470.00480.00480.0046 0.0343
Direct Regression of Actual Change: silt!) —s(t)a +b2(fCt—1) —sCt)
aluk) aCfr) a(wg) a(sw) a(jal b2 OW OFt:bZtO r2
SUB Regression —0.3350 —0.0391 —0.0214 -0.0193 —0.0028 1.0506 54 —0.43 .00 $ 4syptotic se's 0.01270.01470.01490.01630.0149 0.1181
015 Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0401 —0.0411 —0.0244 —0.0222 -0.0046 0.0327 2.17 54 0.6L 0.19 0.01540.0146 0.01480.01480.0146 0.1356
ECON 6 Month —0.1077 —0.1065 -0.0787 —0.0970 —0.0561 0.2317 .1.96 24 1.28 0.77
0.02190.01690.02020.02120.0200 0.1615
EC0NII 6 Month —0.0923 —0.0899 —0.0618 —0.0614 —0.0115 0.4593 2.51 19 2.36 t 0.45 0.02710.02670.02720.02690.0262 0.1942
Indirect Regression: fIt) —sIttI)=a+bIi(t—1) —sIt)
aluk) aifrI a(wg) a(sw) ala)—_____
b OW OF t:br0_—— r2
—
SUBRegression 0.03770.02730.03290.03560.0133 0.0129 54 0.11 .00 Asvototi: se's 0.01260.01450.01490.01830.0153 0.1187
Bootstraa se's 0.01240.01450.01430.01750.0143 0.1635 0.08
015 Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0403 0.0284 0.03440.0371 0.0162 —0.0561 2.07 54 —0.41 0.23
0.01550.01480.0149 0.01490.0147 0.1370
ECON 6 Month 0.10900.01480.1007 0.12710.0803 —0.2334 2.04 24 —1.21 0.79
0.02320.0201 0.02140.02250.0212 0.1925
EC0NII 6 Month 0.08660.06140.08460.09440.0345 -0.4556 2.56 19 —2.10 I 0.45
0.03030.0299 0.03040.03010.0293 0.2171TABLE Sb
AOP1IVE EXPECTATIONS I Indeoendent variable:E(t—1J15ft)]—sIt)
SURVEY DATA RESRESSIONS
Direct Regression of Expected Change: E tsCt+U1 —stt)a +bI(ER—li (sIt)] -s(t)
aCuk) a(fr) alwg) aisw) aCia) bi O DFt:bI:0
SUR Regression 0.02040.01380.03470.03350.0313 0.0178 54 0.65 oats
Asy.ptutic se's 0.00650.00420.00310.00310.0333 0.0273
StIR Regression with
MCi) Ccrrection 0.02020.01390.03380.03290.0306 0.0406 54 1.90
Asyiptotic se's 0.00660.00520.00260.00240.0027 0.0226
ARC!) coefficient 0.13 0.26 —0.13 —0.19 —0.19
aS Regressions
ECON 3 floath 0.02150.01470.03560.03430.031? —0.0031 2.05 54 —0.09 0.81
0.00440.00430.00440.00430.0042 0.0349
ECON 6 Month 0.02950.02900.07600.07400.0687 —0.0216 1.85 24 —0.27 0.96
0.01200.01230.01230.01250.0124 0.0810
ECONII 6 Month 0.02260.0150 0.064! 0.06360.0574 0.0533 2.27 19 1.08 0.94
0.00700.00730.00760.00710.0070 0.0495
Direct Regression of Actual Change: s(t+1) — sit] a +b21ER—i) (sit)]— s(t)
aCuk)alfr) alwg) alsw) aCia) b2 DW OFt:b2i) r2
StiR Regression —0.0333 —0.0370 —0.0193 —0.0176 —0.0012 —0.0713 54 —0.63 0.01 $
Asyiptotic se's 0.01340.01540.01560.01850.0152 0.1133
CURegressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0337—0.0412 -0.0241 —0.0217 —0.0046 0.0341 2.24 54 0.27 0.19
0.01590.31530.01560.01530.0151 0.1250
ECUN 6 Month -0.1031 0.i09B—0.0799-0.9532 —0.0567 0.1396 1.97 24 0.94 0.77
0.02220.02270.02360.02310.0229 0.1492
EC0NII6Month —0.0913—0.1074 —0.0914 —0.0729 —0.0277 0.4714 2.28 19 2.34 $ 0.45
0.02870.02990.03110.02890.0286 0.2019
Indirect Regression: E (sCt+1i3 — sIft]a + biER—ti(sIt)]—sit]
aCuk) aCir] a(wg) alsw) afla) b D OFt:b=0 r2
StIRRegression 0.05960.05550.0592 0.05560.0362 —0.0276 54 -0.23 .00 1
Asymototic se's 0.01740.01600.0169 0.02020.0176 0.1195
Bootstrapse's 0.01730.01540.01630.01920.0169 0.2449 0.11
0LS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.06010.05590.05970.05600.0366 —0.0372 2.20 54 0.26 0.44
0.01790.01730.0176 0.01730.0170 0.1413
ECDN6Month 0.t3260.13950.15530.16930.1253. —0.1612 2.00 24 —0.98 0.39
0.02440.02500.0260 0.02540.0251 0.1642
ECONII 6 Month 0.11980.12240.1455 0.13650.0906 —0.4181 2.24 19 —1.91 0.70
0.03110.03230.0337 0.03140.0310 0.2191
It en...t ......+ CV,...4 U! 1nale lTh.M,..r.se.."...le I J._C S.S —. .11 ...è S—-.TABLE 6a
REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS I/Independent variable:—s(t)
Long Run Eouilibriu2 Constant
FORWARD RATE REGRESSIONS
DirectRegressionof ExpectedChange: 1(t) —sct) r a — bl[ s(t) )
Dummy
a(uk) a(ir) a(wg) a(sw) a(ja) 81—84bI OWOF t:blrOr2
SURRearession 0.0053 —'0.02530.00460.0108 —0.0235 10.0067 591.O9 0.01$
Asymptoticse's 0.00310.01240.0059 0.00480.0337 0.0061
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0037 —0.01830.00800.0135 —0.0041 40.0031 1.26 59 '0.49 0.79
0.00340.01260.00620.00510.0347 0.0063
ECON 6 Month 0.0140 —0.07020.00290.0155 —0.0862 40.0208 1.56 29[.13 0.79
0.01030.03600.01760.01440.1005 0.0184
ECONII 6 Month 0.0027 —0.01390.02990.03870.0655 —0.0069 1.24 24—0.31 0.85
0.01150.04460.02130.0173 0.1241 0.0227
AMEX 6 Month [Day) —0.04840.07960.06400.06760.37960.0207 -1.0591 1.92 39 3.76 2* 0.79
0.01040.02680.01340.01140.08460.0043 0.0157
AMEX 6 Month [Month) —0.0495 0.07970.06380.06700.33950.0213 —0.0591 1.80 39 —3.34 *2 0.79
0.01020.02630.01310.01120.08290.00430.0154
Direct Regressionof Actual Change: s(t+1I — s(tla — b2( s(t)
-
Oummv
a(uk) dIr) a(wg) a(sw) dial 81—94 b2 OW OFt:b2rO r2
SURRearession —0.0262 —'0.0941 —0.0464 —0.0379 —0.1752 40.0314 59thIS 0.02 $
Asymptotic se's 0.01600.04870.02610.02440.1230 0.0237
OLSRearessions
ECOE3 Month -'0.06020.05310.02380.01340.2317 —0.0431 2.23 59—0.80 0.15
0.02840.10710.05260.04300.2942 0.0537
ECON 6 Month —0.12620.06650.02060.00330.3948 —0.0789 3.05 29—1.01 0.59
0.04340.15200.07420.06060.4242 0.0777
ECONII 6 Month —0.0423 —0.1193 —0.057? 1.0422 —0.1377 tO.0235 2.83 24+0.17 0.27
0.06940.26840.12850.10410.7474 0.1364
AMEX 6 Month (Day) —'0.00770.09340.08550.12260.2485 —0.0767 —0.0330 1.80 39 —0.37 0.29
0.05990.15380.07680.06550.48580.02480.0902
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0052 0.0285 0.05160.09310.0654 —0.0749 +0.0007 1.916 39 •0.01 0.26
- 0.05980.15350.07660.0656 0.48470.02520.0899
Indirect Regression: 1(t) —s(t+1)a — b( s(t)
Dummy
a(uk) dIr) a(wgl a(sw) a(ja) 81—84
—
b DW OFt:brj r2
SUR Regression 0.044! 0.01400.02500.02780.0007 iO.0030 59 tO.15 .00 $
Asymptotic se's 0.01510.0421 0.02130.0225 0.1088 0.0198
Bootstrap se's 0.01780.06270.03200.02630.1695 0.0307 tO.10
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0638 —'0.0715 —0.0153 —0.0049 4.2359 +0.0463 2.20 59 +0.86 0.20
0.02860.10780.05300.04330.2962 0.0541
ECONS Month 0.1401 —'0.1367 —0.01760.0122 1.4810 f0.0997 2.87 29 +1.29 0.66
0.04300.15070.07360.06010.4206 0.0771
ECONII 6 Nonth 0.0455 0.10590.08780.08090.2032 —0.0304 2.72 24 —0.21 0.31
0.0755 0.29170.13960.11310.8124 0.1463
AMEX 6 Month (Day)-0.0408 —0.0137 —0.0215 —0.0550 0.09110.0974 —0.0261 1.86 39—0.27 0.23
0.06320.16220.08100.06910.51250.02620.0951
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —005450.05130.0122 —0.0260 0.27410.0967 —0.0598 1.96 39 —0.63 0.20
0.06280.16120.08050.06890.50090.02640.0944
* , Itindicate significance at St and IX levels. Sr2 rnrrncnnnde 4.TABLE 6b
REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS I IIndependentvariabl;--p)
Lana Run Equilihrius Constant
SURQEYDATA REGRESSIONS
DirectRegression of Expected Change: E ts(t+1)1 —sIt)a — bI( s(t)
Dunv
— a(ukYa(fr) a(Nq) a(ss)a(jaI9(14-bI OW OFt:blrr) r2
STiR Regression 0.0429 —3.0877 —0.0133 —0.0053 1.0249 40.3513 59r4.13U0.201
Asy.ptoticse's 0.00680.02470.01200.00980.0679 0.0124
013 Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0467 —0.t042 —0.0217 —0.0116 —0.2942 iO.0596 1.60 59•4.82 St025 0.00650.02460.01210.00990.0677 0.0124
ECON 6 Month 0.3751 —0.1794 —0.0272 4.0114 —0.5061 40.1052 1.53 29i377 :50.39 0.01560.05450.02660.02170.1522 0.0279
ECONII 6 Month 0.0960 —0.2701 10688 1.0465 1.0727 40.1441 2.71 24+5.49 II 0.75 0.0E4 0.05160.02470.02000.1438 0.0262
AMEX 6 Month Day) —0.04440. 10810.06800.04740.37340.0381 .0.0665 3.14 39-2.34 1 0.54
0.01890.04860.02430.02070.15350.00780.0295
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.04140.10180.06450.04740.35060.0432 -0.0621 2.79 39—2.67 11 0.71
0.01550.03980.01990.01700.12550.00650.0233
DirectRegression of Actual Change: s(t+11 — s(t)ra— h2(s(t))
Duaty
—
a(uk) a(fri a(wg) a(sw) aIja) 8114 b2 OW OFt:b2=0 r2
SUR Regression —0.0262 —0.0941 —0.0464 —0.0379 —0.1758 +0.0314 59 '1.35 0.02 $
Asyiptotic se's 0.01600.04870.0261 0.02440.1280 0.0233
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.06020.0531 0. 02330.01840.2317 --0.043! 2.22 59—0.50 0.15
0.02840.1071 0.05260.04300.2942 0.0537
ECON 6 Month —0.12620.06650.02060.0033 0.1942 —0.0789 3.05 29 —1.01
0.04340.15200.07420.06060.4242 0.0777
ECONI1 6 Month —0.0423 —0.1199 —0.0579 —0.0422 -0.1377 40.0235 2.93 2440.17 0.27
0.06940.26840.12850.10410.7474 0.1364
AMEX 6 Month (Day) —0.00770.09340.08550.12260.2495 —0.0767 —0.0330 1.80 394.37 0.29
0.05990.15380.07680.06550.48520.02480.0902
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.00520.02850.05160.09310.0654 —0.0749 40.0007 1.92 39 -0.Ot 0.26
0.05980.15350.07660.06560.40470.02520.0899
IndirectRegression: E (s(ttl)I —s(t+1) r a — h( s(t) I
Dunv
a(uk) a(fr) a(wq) a{sw) a(ja) 81—34 b OW OFt:brO r2
STiRRegression 0.1048 —0.1487 —0. 0413 —0.0267 —0.5021 *0.0984 59 +5.34 U0.18$
Asyaototic se's 0. 01620.03690.02230.02230.0932 0.0168
9ootstrap se's 0.02060.07060.03590.03130.1923 0.0350 42.81 U
OLSRegressions
ECON 3 Month 0.1069 —0.1573 —0.0455 —0.0300 —0.5259 -'0.1027 2.24 59 '1.73 0.42
0.03130.11820.35800.04750.3246 0.0593
ECON 6 Month 0.2013 —0.245? —0.0477 —0.0148 —0.9009 •0.1841 3.52 29 2.12 1 0.78
0.0484 0.16950.08290.0676 0.4731 0.0867
ECONII 6 Month 0.1388 —0.1503 —0.0109 —0.0043 —0.5895 +0.1206 2.92 24 +0.81 0.59
0.07600.2933 0.14060.1139 0.8181 0.1493
AMEX 6 Month (Day) —0.03670.0147 -0.0176 1.0752 0.12480.1149 --0.0335 2.08 39 -0.33 0.29
0.06800.17430.08700.07430.55090.02810.1022
-
AMEX6 Month (Month) —0.04650.07340.012? —0.04570.20520.1191 -.0.0629 1.96 39 0.65 0.32
0.06400.16420.08200.0702 0.51860.02690.0962
I • Itindicatesignificance atStand 1% levels. r2 correcoonds tninn—..'..TABLE 7a —
REBRE3SIVEEXPECTATIONS Ill Lndeoendent variable: sIt)— sIt)
Lanq Run Eaui[ibritzs PPP
F3AARODISCOUNT 8EBRESSIONS
DirectRegression o Expected Change: fIt) —sIt)a +bI(?It) —sIt) I
Duisv
aluk)a(fr) a(wg) aiss) alja) 81—84bI OW OF t:blrO r2
StIR Re*resgjon 0.0021 —0.01470.01020.01550.0128 0.0019 59 0.30 .00 $ Asyiptatcse's 0.00150.008?0.00260.00190.0017 0.0066
OLS 3eressions
ECOW3Qnth 0.0053 —1.02090.00550.0112 —0.0133 0.0046 1.43 59 0.72 0.79 3.00460.01230.00730.00680.0367 0.0065
ECON 6 Month 0.0179 —0.0665 -0.00160.0100 —0.0380 0.0204 1.68 29 0.99 0.79 0.01520.03740.02440.02160.1168 0.0207
ECONII 6 Month —0.00620.00480.04430.05180.1237 —0.0179 1.17 21 —0.66 0.36
0.01380.04910.03170.02790.1531 0.0271
AMEX 6 Month (Bay) —0.07420.10620.08740.09290.46180.0306 —0.0914 2.33 - 39—5.04 U 0.32
0.01230.02330.01460.01340.00740.00500.0181
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.07740.11070.08970.09450.47710.0325 —0.0842 2.28 39—5.17 8 0.84
0.01220.02420.01400.01290.08350.00480.0154
Direct Regression ol Actual Change: s(t+l) — sIt)a f h2(tIt)sIt)
Dun',
a(uk) aI4r)aSq) a(sw) aIM) 81—84 b2 OW OF t:b20 r2
StIR Regression —0.0479 —0.1636 —0.0529 —0.0346 —0.0144 0.1001 59 2.54 1*0.07 $
Asymptotic se's 0.01220.05410.02000.01840.0132 0.0394
01.3 Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0464 -0.0153 —0.0063 —0.00510.0465 —0.0090 2.21 59 —0.16 0.14
0.03930.10460.08890.05790.3135 0.0554
ECDN 6 Month —0.15940.09940.06800.05070.5491 —0.1037 3.08 29 —1.20 0.59
0.08340.15610.10190.09000.4871 0.0863
ECONII 6 Month —0.0252 —0.1502 —0.0854 —0.0683 —0.2474 0.0423 2.79 24 0.26 0.27
0.11410.29740.19240.16930.9280 3.1643
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.04430.15320.12410.13960.4745 -0.0646 —0.0746 1.84 39 —0.74 0.30
0.08060.15910.09180.08450.54940.03110.1014
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.01700.07500.07790.11680.2279 —0.0690 —0.0293 1.96 39 —0.29 0.26
0.06100.15980.09220.08510.55170.03180.1019
IndirectRegression: fIt) —s(t+1) = a+hI 1(t)—sIt)
Dunv
a(uk) a(fr) a(wg) aIss) aIM) 81—94 b OW OFt:b=0 r2
StIR Regression 3.04610.08040.04440.03940.0219 —0.0460 59 —1.24 0.02 $
Asy.otot:c se's 0.01250.05120.01930.01820.1131 0.0371
3ootstrapseas 0.01170.06210.02170.01950.0137 0.0458 —1.00
013 Regressions
ECON LI Month 0.0517 —0.00550.01180.0163 —0.0597 0.0136 2.14 59 0.24 0.19
0.03960.10530.06740.05830.3157 0.0558
ECON 6 Month 0.1773 -0.1659 —0.0696 —0.0407 —0.6371 0.1241 2.90 29 1.45 0.66
0.06230.15470.10t00.08920.4829 0.0836
ECONLI a Month 0.01900.15500.12970.11980.3771 -0.0602 2.67 24 0.34 0.31
0.1239 0.32300.20900.183?1.0079 0.1731
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.0299 —0.0471 —0.0368 —0.0669 -0.11270.0952 —0.0068 1.91 39 —0.06 0.22
0.08560.16890.09740.08970.58320.03310.1076
AMEX 6 Month (Month) -0.05960.03570.0117 -0.02230.24920.1005 -0.0549 1.99 39-0.51 0.19
0.0853 0.16830.09710.08970.58100.03350.1072
1 , U indicate significance at 5Z and 17. levels. r2 corresponds to approximate F test on all nnn—" nr'"'"TABLETh
RESRE3SIVE EXPECTATIONS I! fIndependentvariable: ?lt— sit]
Long Run EpuiLibrius PPP
SURVEYDATAREgRESSIONS
Direct Regression of Expected Change: E Cs(tflJ —sit)=a+ bl( lit) —sit)I
Duaiv
a(uk) a(fr) aiwg) aiss) aija) 91—84 hi OW OF t:bI0 r2
StIR Regression 0.0153 —'3.06050.01410.32200.0261 0.0564 59 3.56 U 0.15$
Asyiptatic se's 0.00400.0210 0.00640.00420.0034 0.0138
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0533 —0.0823 —0.0260 —0.0185 1.2580 0.0512 2.12 59 3.83 It 0.84
0.00950.02330.0162 0.01400.0758 0.0134
ECON 6 Month 0.1014 —0.1771 —0.0606 —0.0484 —0.5664 0.1125 2.55 29 3.53 *1 0.89
0.02340.05760.03760.03320.1796 0.0318
ECONII 6 Month 0.1396 —0.2053 —0.1273 —0.1080 -0.8696 0.1646 2.56 24 4.72 *1 0.94
0.02330.06070.0392 0.03450.1093 0.0334
AMEX 6 Month(Day)—0.04080.07210.05680.04210.20040.0397 —0.0490 2.85 39 —1.46 0.50
0.02660.05250.0303 0.02790.10140.01030.0335
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.0406 0.07330.05700.04490.28150.0453 —0.0409 2.49 39 —1.77 0.68
0.02200.04340.02500.02310.14960.00860.0276
flirect Regression ol Actual Change: s(t+1) —sit)a +b2(Tit) —sit)
Ouny
aluk) aCfr) a(wg) a(s) aija) 81—84 b2 OW OF t:b2:i) r2
StIR Regression —0.047! —0.1636 —0.0529 —0.0346 —0.0144 0. 1001 59 2.54 ** 0.07 $
Asyiptotic se's 0.01220.05410.02000.01840.0132 0.0394
1.3 Reqressiorts
ECON 3 Month —0.0464 —0.0153 —0.0063 —00051 0.0465 1.0090 2.21 59 —0.16 0.14
0.03930.10460.06690.05790.3135 0.0554
ECON 6 Month —0.15940.0994 0.06800.05070.5491 4.1037 3.08 29 —1.20 0.59
0.06340.15610.10190.09000.4871 0.0863
ECONII 6 Month 4.0252 —0.1502 —0.0854 4.0680 —0.2474 0.0423 2.79 24 0.26 0.27
0.11410.2974 0.19240.16930.9280 0.1640
AMEX 6 Month (Day) —0.04430.15320.1241 0.15960.4745 —0.0646 —0.0746 1.04 39 —0.74 0.30
0.08060.15910.09180.08450.5494 0.03110.1014
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.01730.07500.07790.11680.2279 —0.0680 -0.0293 1.96 39 —0.29 0.26
0.0810 0.1.5980.09220.08510.55170.03180.1018
Indirect Regression: E ls(t+1.)] —sit4I)=a+ hi TItI —sit)I
Duny
a(uk)a(fr) a(wg) a(sw) a{ja) 81—84 b OW OF t:b0 r2
SUR Regression 0.0532 —0.06300.02150.03080.0277 0.0829 59 2.35 II 0.05
Asyiptotic se's 0.01460.04900.0201 0.01950.0150 0.0352
Bootstrap se's 0.01460.07230.02400.02040.0161 0.0539 1.54
01.5 Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0997 —0.0669 —0.0197 —0.0133 —0.3045 0.0602 2.15 59 0.97 0.40
0.04390.11670.07470.06460.3499 0.0618
ECON 6 Month 0.2608 -'3.2765 4.1297 4.0992 —1.1155 0.2161 3.54 29 2.25 1 0.79
0.07060.17390.11350.10020.5427 0.0962
ECCNII6Month. 0.1647 —0.1351 1.0411 4.0400 —0.6212 0.1223 2.94 0.58
0.1255 0.32700.21160.18621.0205 0.1003
AMEX 6 Month (Day) 0.0035 1.0811 —0.0673 -0.1176 4.1940 0.10430.0256 2.13 39 0.22 0.29
0.0920 0. 1815 0. 10470.09640.62670.0355 0. 1156
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.0228 4.0019 4.0210 —0.07180.05360.1133 —0.0197 2.01 39 1.18 0.31
0.08720.17210.09930.09160.59390.03420.1096
* ,It indicatesignificance at St and IZ levels. $r2 corresponds to approxi.ate F test on all non—intercept paraeters.TABLE 8a
PPP EXPECTATIONS I Indenendent variable: EVII_7?tj
FORWARD DISCOUNT RE6RESSIONS
Direct Regression of Expected Change: fit) —sIt)ra+bliEI7T_1T*]
duny
a 1981-04 hI DW OFt:bl=0 r2
SUR Rearessian 0.0072 048I3 46 7.85U Asyiptoticse's 0.0012 0.0613
OLSRegressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0035 1.2173 0.97 46 8.85 U 0.62 0.0011 0.1376
ECON 6 Month 0.0084 1.2862 1.06 22 6.26 5* 0.62 0.0034 0.2053
ECONII 6 Month 0.0077 1.1504 1.46 18 6.35 *1 0.67 0.0031 0. 1812
AMEX 6 Month (day) 0.0024 0.01670.6925 1.94 22 6.53St 0.74 0.0030 0.00300.1061
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0030 0.01610.6710 1.93 22 6.47 1* 0.7334
0.0029 0.00490.1037
Direct Regression of Actual Change: sittI? —sit]=a+h2(El ITTf!J
duny
a 1981—04 b2 DW OF t:62=0 r2
SUR Regression —0.0254 1.3136 46 2.43 *1
Asyiptotic se's 0.0104 0.5416
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0230 1. 1964 2.43 46 1.26 0.01 0.0073 0.9510
ECON 6 Month —0.0639 1.2030 2.78 22 2.06 0.12
0. 0095 0.5826
ECONI! 6 Month —0.0405 1.1259 1.96 18 1.43 0.05 0.0(34 0.7858
AMEX 6 Month (dayl 0.0559 —0.10361.3614 1.88 22 2.45 * 0.42 0.0156 0.0263 0.5559
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0473 —0.10151.2819 1.86 22 2.38 1 0.40
0.0151 0.02550.5381








Asyiptotic se's 0.0106 0.5308
Bootstrap se's 0.0128 0.3572 0.02
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.0265 0.0210 2.31 46 0.02 0.00
0.0074 0.9596
ECON 6 Month 0.0723 0.0834 2.66 22 0.14 0.00
0. 0099 0.6043
ECONII 6 Month 0.0482 0.0245 1.88 18 0.03 0.00
0.0147 0.3611
AMEX 6 Month (day) —0.0529 0.1247 —0.6903 2.04 22 t.19 0.43
0.0163 0.02760.5825
AMEX 6 Month (Month) -0.0449 0.1132 -0.5894 2.03 22 —1.05 0.42
0.0158 0.02670.5639
U indicate significance at 5% and IX levels. r2 corresponds to approxiiate F test an all non—interceat oaraipfpr.TABLE Oh
PPPEXPECTATIONS / Indenendent variable: E(7r.7r*)
SURVEYDATA REGRESSIONS
Direct Regression of Expected Change: E ts(t+1)1 —s(t) a + bit EE7rir*]
duisy — a 1981—04 OW OFt:bIrO r2
SURRegression 0.0245 1.1155 464.33 ** 005 Asysptoticse's 0.0018 0.2546
OLS Regressions
ECON 3Month 0.0237 1.2417 1.96 464.67 U 0.31 0.0020 0.2657
ECCN 6 Month 0.0454 1.4251 1.69 22 5.13 U 0.52 0.0046 0.2780
ECONI! 6 Month 0.0403 1.2658 1.71 18 5.45 ** 0.o 0.0040 0.2323
AMEX 6 Month (day) 0.0085 0.031? 0.3797 1.60 22 2.75 ** 0.62 0.0039 0.00650.1383
AMEX 6 Month (MonthI 0.0076 0.03930.3426 1.70 22 2.34 1 0.66 0.0041 0.00690.1463
Direct Regression of Actual Change: sIft!) —s(t)ra+ b2( E[7t—IfI
daisy
a 1981—84 b2 OW OFt:b2:O r2
SLIR Regression —0.0254 1.3136 46 2.43 1 Asy.ptoticse's 0.0104 0.5416
OLS Regressions
ECON3Month -0.0230 1.1964 2.43 46 1.26 0.01 0.0073 0.9510
ECON 6 Month —0.0639 1.2030 2.78 22 2.06 0.12 0.0095 0.5826
ECONII 6 Month —0.0405 1.1259 1.96 18 1.43 0.05 0.0134 0.7858
AMEX 6 Month (day) 0.0559 —0.10861.3614 1.28 22 2.45 1 0.42 0.0156 0.02630.5559
AMEX6 Month (Month) 0.0473 —0.10151.2819 1.86 22 2.38 * 0.40 0.0151 0.02550.5381
indirect Regression: E Cs(t+1)] —s(t+1)a + hI E(7T—7TI
duny
a 1981—04 b OW OFt:b=0 rZ
SURRegression 0.0502 0.3572 46 0.59 Asyiptotic se's 0.0117 0.6022
Bootstrap se's 0.0150 0.3767 0.95
OLS Regressions
ECON3 Month 0.0467 0.0454 2.18 46 0.04 0.00
0.0082 1.0662
•ECON 6 Month 0.1093 0.2221 2.27 22 0.34 0.00
0.0108 0.6574
ECONII 6 Month 0.0808 0.139? 1.86 18 0.16 0.00
0.0146 0.8527
AMEX 6 Month (day) —0.0473 0.1406 —0.9817 2.06 22 —1.75 0.52
0.0157 0.02650.5594
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.0396 0.1409 —0.9394 1.93 22 —1.80 0.56
0.0146 0.02480.5227
* .*1indicate sionificanre at Si and IX leveR. r2 carresoonds to aooroxiiate F test on all non—interceot paraseters.TABLE 9a
REGRESSIVE INFLATION ADJUSTEDEXPECTATIONS IIndependent variable: 5(t)—sit)
FORWARDDISCOUNTREGRESSIONS
Direct Regression oi Expected Change: 4(t) —sit) — E[1T—7r'a+bL(sIt) —s(t)
dusty
——
a 1981:04 bI OW OFt:bl:0 rZ
SUR ReQression 0.0070 —0.0078 46 —5.77 U
AsysptotLc se's --0.0011 0.0014
OLS Reoressians
ECCW3 Month 0.0062 —0.0121 0.86 46 —2.22 1 0.08
0.0016 0.0055
ECON 6 Month 0.0120 —0.0227 0.80 22 —1.15 0.01
0.0049 0.0191
EONII 6 Month 0,0177 —0.0489 1.01 18 —2.71 St 0.25
0.0047 0.0180
AMEX 6 Month (day) 0.0067 0.0136 —0.0087 1.79 22 —0.38 0.10
0.0033 0.00700.0232
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0059 0.0145 —0.0089 1.83 22 —0.39 0.12
0.0033 0.00700.0229
Direct Regressionai Actual Change:s(t+1) —sit) — EC 7r—Wj a +b2(sit) —sit)
dusty
a 1981-fl b2 OW OFt:b2rO rZ
SUR Regression —0.0260 —0.0125 46 2.39*
Asysptoticse's 0.0115 0.0052
OLSRegressions
EC0N3 Month —0.0223 —0.0032 2.42 46 —0.02 0.00
0.0113 0.0367
EC0N 6 Month —0.0600 —0.0240 2.92 22 —0.44 0.00
0.0136 0.0551
ECONII 6 Month —0.0373 —0.0149 1.94 18 —0.16 0.00
0.0226 0.0911
AMEX 6 Month (day) 0.0535 —0.0928 —0.0663 1.60 22 —0.64 0.39
0.0146 0.03100.1035
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0449 —0.0931 —0.0279 1.91 22 0.22 0.37
0.0142 0.03050.0996
Indirect Regression: f(t) — s(t+1) = a + b C s(t) — sit))
dusty





ECON 3 Month SEE INDIRECT REGRESSION IN TABLE 7A
ECON 6 Month
ECONII 6 Month
AMEX 6 Month {day)
AMEX 6 Month (Month)
* , IS indicate siqnificance at 5% and 1% levels.rZ corresponds to approxisate F test on all non—intercept paraseters.TABLE Yb
REGRESSIVE INFuTIg jUgSEHA5I Independent variable: ru—siti
DirectRegressionof Expected Change: E (s(ttt)] — sit) — E (7111*1 = a + bIt 1t) — sit)
dusty
a 1981—04bI OW DFt:bl:0 r2
STiR Regression 0.0237 0.0003 46 0.15
Asymptoticse's 0.0025 0.0020
015Regressions
ECON3 Month - 0.0180 0.0259 1.65 46 2.54 1E 0.10
0.0030 0.0102
ECON 6 Month 0.0339 0.0611 1.10 22 2.50 Xl 0.19
0.0060 0.0245
ECONII 6 Month 0.0130 0.0384 1.54 IS 1.46 0.06
0.0065 0.0264
AMEX 6 Monthday) 0.0150 0.02310.0076 1.29 22 0.21 0.20
0.0050 0.01070.0356
AMEX6 Month (Month) 0.0142 0.02790.0189 1.36 22 0.51 0.29
0.0053 0.01140.0311
DirectRegression of Actual Change: s(t+1) — sit) — Etirir'= a + b2( itt)—sit)
duny
a 1981—fl b2 DEbb2=0 r2
StIR Regression —0.0260 —0.0125 46 —2.39 $
Asymptoticse's 0.0115 0.0052
01.5 Regressions
EC0N 3 Month —0.0223 —0.0032 2.42 46 —0.08 0.00
0.0113 0.0387
ECON 6 Month —0.0600 —0.0240 2.92 22 —0.44 0.00
0.0136 0.0551
ECDNII 6 Month —0.0373 - —0.0149 1.94 18 —0.16 0.00
0.0226 0.0911
AMEX6Month (day) 0.0535 —0.0928 —0.0663 1.60 22 —0.64 0.39
0.0146 0. 03100.1035
MEl 6 Month (Month) 0.04-49 —0.0931 —0.0279 1.91 22 —0.28 0.37
0.0142 0.03050.0996
1directRegression: E (slt+l)1 —s(t+1) = a + b IsTt)— sit) I
dumsy





ECON3 Month SEE INDIRECT REGRESSION IN TABLE 71
ECOII 6 Month
ECONII 6 Month
AMEX 6 Month (day)
AMEX 6 Month (Month)
*,1*indicate siqnificance at Stand12levels. r2 corresponds toapproximate Ftest onallnon—intercept parameters.TABLE IOa
TESTS OF EXCESSIVE SPECULaTION I Independent variable: fit) —s(t)
FORWARD DISCOUNT REGRESSIONS
Direct Regression of Actual Change: s(ttl) —sit)a +b2(fit) —sit)
Ouny —
a(uk) a(fr) a(ig) aCsw) a(ja) 81—84 b2 DII OFt:b20 r2
SURRegression -0.0409 -0.0299 -0.0189 -0.0171 -0.0066 0.1801 59 0.31 .00 $
Asyaptotic se's 0.01190.01730.01590.01990.0152 0.5721
OLS Regressions
ECON3 Month —0.0404—0.0325 —0.0165 -0.0137 —0.0030 —0.0344 2.20 591.03 0.14
0.01460.01970.01880.02270.0203 1.1065
ECON 6 Month —0.0090—0.0725 —0.0621 -0.0688 —0.0478 0.4646 2.82 29 0.60 0.58
0.02090.0311 0.02690.03160.0294 0.7759
ECONII 6 Month —0.0372-0.15070.02950.06880.0678 —2.7917 2.79 24—2.57 II 0.42
0.02390.03770.03430.04300.0377 1.0874
AMEX6 Month (Day) 0.00240.02120.07220.12500.0891 —0.0711 —0.8491 1.59 39 —1.09 0.31
0.02420.03080.02550.03470.03150.02290.7766
AMEX 6 Month (Month) —0.00740.01180.06670.1900.0890 —0.0629 —0.9163 1.76 39 —1.17 0.28
0.02460.03080.02550.03450.0316 0.02330.7936
Indirect Regression: f(t) —s(t1) a +b(fit) —sit)
Duny
a(uk) a(fr) a(wq) a(sw) aija) 81—04 b DII OF t;b0 r2
SUR Reqressian 0.04090.02990.01890.01710.0066 0.8199 59 1.43 0.03 $
Asyaptotic se's 0.01190.01730.01590.01990.0152 0.5721
Bootstrap se's 0.01150.01760.0171 0.02190.0176 0.8652 0.95
OLS Regressions
ECON 3 Month 0.04040.03250.01650.01370.0038 1.0344 2.20 59 0.93 0.20
0.01460.01970.01880.02270.0203 1.1065
ECON 6 Month 0.0890 0.07250.06210.06830.0478 0.5354 2.82 29 0.69 0.64
0.02090.03110.02680.03160.0294 0.7759
ECONII 6 Month 0.0372 0.1507 —0.0295 —0.0688 —0.0678 3.7917 2.79 24 3.49 1* 0.54
0.02380.03770.03430.04300.0377 1.0874
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.0024 —0.0212 —0.0722 —0.1250• —0.0891 0.0711 1.8491 1.59 39 2.38 1* 0.32
0.02420.0308 0.02550.03470.03150.02290.7766
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0074 1.0118 —0.0667 1.1190 1.0890 0.0629 1.9163 1.76 39 2.45 1* 0.30
0.02460.0308 0.02550.03450.03140.02330.7836
I ,*1indicate significance at SZ and it levels. $r2corresponds to approxiiate F test on all non—intercept para.eters.TABLE lOb
TESTSOF EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IIndependentvariable: E(s(ttl)l—s(t)
SURVEY DATA REGRESSIONS
Direct RegressionalAtua1 Change: s(t+1) —sit) a +b2(E Cs(t1)1 —sit)
Duny
a(uk) a(fr) a(wg) a(sw) a(ja) 8114 b2 OW OFt:b2:0 r2
SURRegression —0.0303 —0.02510.001! 0.0032 0.0123 —0.5211 59 —1.88 0.05 $ Asyiptotic se's 0.01230.01630.0161 0.0177 0.0134 0.2773
OLE Regressions
ECON 3 Month —0.0148 —0.01420.02860.02990.0376 -1.3193 2.34 59 —2.93 1*0.25 0.01610.01480.02050.02020.0196 0.4503
ECOM6 Month —0.0746 —0.0730 —0.0139 —0.01860.0017 —0.5470 2.72 29 —1.30 0.60 0.02240.02270.03540.03420.0348 0.4193
ECONILóMonth —0.0295 —0.06320.01990.02760.0450 —0.8734 2.87 24 —1.28 0.31 0.03150.02630.05050.04810.0491 0.6840
AMEX 6 Month (Day) 0.0101 0.03520.069!0.10330.0825 —0.0599 —0.7557 1.53 39 —1.64 0.34 0.0220 0.02630.02290.02630.0272 0.02440.4598
AMEX 6 Month (Month) 0.0030 0.02950.059! 0.09660.0774 —0.0590 —0.4932 1.88 39 —0.88 0.27 0.02260.02700.02390.02720.02850.02950.5630
Indirect Regression: E (s(t+1)J- s(t1)a + bCECs(t+1)l -sIt)
Ouny
a(uk) a(fr) a(wg) a(sw) a(ja) 81—84 b OW OFt:b:0 r2
SURRegression 0.03030.0251 —0.001!—0.0032 —0.0123 1.521! 59 5.49 4* Asyptotic se's 0.01230.01630.016! 0.01770.0134 0.2773
Bootstrap se's 0.01200.01590.01780.01950.0159 0.3386 4.49 *4
OLERegressions
ECON 3 Month 0.01480.0142 —0.0286 -0.0299 —0.0376 2.3193 2.34 59 5.15 *1 0.53
0.01610.01480.02050.02020.0196 0.4503
ECON6 Month 0.07460.07300.01390.0186 —0.0017 1.5470 2.72 29 3.69 4* 0.83
0.02240.02270.03540.03420.0348 0.4193
ECONI! 6 Month 0.02950.0632 —0.0199 —0.0276 —0.0450 1.8734 24 2.74 *4 0.68
0.03150.02630.05050.0481 0.0491 0.6840
AMEX 6 Month (Day)—0.0101 —0.0352 —0.0691 —0.1033 —0.0825 0.05991.7557 1.53 39 3.82 *4 0.48
0.02200.02630.02230.02630.02720.02440.4598
AMEX6 Month (Month) —0.0030 —0.0285 —0.0591 —0.0966 —0.07740.05901.4932 1.88 39 2.65 41 0.42
0 02260.02700.02390.02720.02850.02850.5630
U 4n.i4r+ c;.,ni:; r.nr. ,e cv '—.4 1 ._ --